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ABSTRACT

In 2013, Medicare launched the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI)
Initiative which linked payments for multiple services for a complete episode of patient care.
With this innovative reimbursement model, hospitals accepted fixed target payments for certain
types of clinical diagnoses that were intended to support better care coordination and better
outcomes for patients at lower cost to Medicare. This was one of many programs aimed at
addressing the serious challenges facing United States healthcare, including costs that are
skyrocketing to unsustainable levels and lack of coordination of care across venues.
Preliminary Medicare results showed that bundled payments might lead to lower costs
and higher quality of care, however, this idea comes from a relatively small sample size and
limited run time of the program. This study examined one large community hospital in the
southeast part of the United States participating in the BPCI Initiative. Patient level data was
retrospectively analyzed using statistical techniques to determine if financial, operational and
clinical outcomes improved as result of the BPCI program compared to similar patient data
before the program.
The results were mixed. Financial outcomes did not change significantly, and remained
higher than the CMS targets. Length of stay decreased significantly, as anticipated. The 30-day
readmissions was statistically unchanged. This study illuminated both challenges and strategies
in implementing bundled payments to achieve positive financial, operational, and clinical
outcomes.
vii

CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION

Introduction
The American healthcare delivery system is unlike almost any other in the world, and it is
in a period of massive transformation. This is driven by steep technological innovation in the
healthcare industry, economic pressure to reduce costs, increasing government focus on reform,
and the consumerization of healthcare bringing social demand for choices and information
transparency. The United States health system is a kaleidoscope of public and private financing,
insurance, delivery, and payment mechanisms that are only loosely coordinated and with little
standardization (Shi & Singh, 2015). And although it does deliver some remarkable results in
clinical research, screening, and treatment (cancer and heart diseases, for examples) (NCHS,
2016a), it fails on two broad and important points: controlled costs and consistently high quality.
Healthcare Cost
Healthcare costs are on a soaring trajectory that is not sustainable. America spends more
per capita on healthcare than any other industrialized nation, topping $9,990 per person per year.
Refer to Figure 1 below. In 2015, national health expenditures grew by 5.8 percent totaling $3.2
trillion and accounted for 17.8 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It is projected to
continue to grow at an average rate of 5.6 percent from 2016 through 2025, reaching over $5
trillion annually. Despite some years of decelerated growth, this level of growth is still faster
than that of the projected GDP, which means that healthcare expenditures will reach one-fifth of
1

the economy in the next ten years, according to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS, 2016b). Refer to Figure 2 below. And, furthermore, a disproportionate amount of the
growth will be attributed to federal Medicare spending. This is a reflection of the rise in use of
Medicare services and more baby boomers reaching the age of Medicare entitlement.

Figure 1. U.S. healthcare costs per capita compared to other countries. (Source: PGPF, 2017)

Figure 2. National health expenditures as percentage of GDP. (Source: PGPF, 2017)
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Healthcare Quality
In addition to soaring costs, the American healthcare system also does not provide equal
access, consistent quality, or coordinated and safe care to all Americans. Despite spending more
per capita on healthcare services than any other developed country, life expectancy is not among
the highest and health outcomes are, in many cases, no better and often worse (OECD, 2015).
This is illustrated in the Figures 3 and 4 below.

Figure 3. U.S. healthcare quality outcomes compared to other countries. (Source: PGPF, 2017)

Figure 4. U.S. life expectancy compared to other countries. (Source: PGPF, 2017)
3

Problem Statement
The federal government analyzed, over many years, a broad range of approaches to solve
the dual-pronged healthcare problem: how to greatly reduce the costs of the healthcare industry
while also improving the quality of healthcare delivery. One of those approaches was to pay
Medicare providers for bundles of services instead of the traditional individual payments for
each service. A single payment would be made for all services and providers related to a
particular disease or treatment over a defined period of time, with the expectation that the total
payment would be less than under the current system. This approach would necessarily
encourage care coordination for greater efficiency among the providers, with the expectation that
quality and outcomes would improve.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated the savings for bundling of certain
types of episodes of care to be $34 billion for the period 2017 to 2026. And while preliminary
results show that bundled payments might, indeed, lead to lower costs and higher quality of care,
this impression comes from a relatively small sample size and limited run time of the program.
There are also risks, such as cost-shifting, with these programs that have not been fully explored.
This study, therefore, attempted to close some of these gaps in knowledge by investigating the
efficacy of one of the bundled payment programs implemented in a hospital in the southeast part
of the United States.
Background
There are a myriad of forces putting pressure on the healthcare industry, beginning
fundamentally with a population that is both growing in numbers and aging. The older
population uses more healthcare services and therefore, more money is spent per capita. Refer to
Figures 5 and 6 below. Certainly, a principal goal of U.S. healthcare policy is to reduce injuries,
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diseases, and disabilities, yielding healthier people who live longer, according to the National
Center for Health Statistics (NCHS, 2016c). The NCHS program Healthy People 2020 is a ten
year agenda to improve the health of all people in the United States (NCHS, 2016b). The more
successful our policies are, the more population aging we will encounter.

Figure 5. U.S. growth of elderly population. (Source: PGPF, 2017)

Figure 6. Medical spending increases by age. (Source: PGPF, 2017)
5

There are many other factors besides the changing demographics driving the need for
reform in the American healthcare delivery system. Following is a partial list of the forces of
change, according to Shi and Singh (2015).
•

Social: unhealthy lifestyles to include alcohol and drug abuse, smoking, obesity,
sedentary lifestyles, and poor nutrition; non-compliance with medication and
physician recommendations

•

Economic: rising hospital costs, national debt and budget shortfalls, disparities in
access to care providers based on geography and socio-economics, a significant
increase in Americans with health insurance seeking care

•

Political: divided country on healthcare policy issues, uncertainty about ACA and
legislative changes

•

Technological: disruptive technologies providing new health tools and information
for providers as well as consumers

•

Ecological: new diseases, natural disasters, bio-terrorism, an increase in chronic
diseases and acute conditions

•

Global: medical tourism, overseas drug manufacturing leading to safety and supply
issues, telemedicine, provider migration

•

Anthro-cultural: changing beliefs, values and traditions related to healthcare, the rise
of health industry consumerism

•

Practice: inconsistent quality of care and outcomes, healthcare infrastructure
limitations, defensive medicine with unnecessary or duplicative tests

6

Government Reform
The healthcare landscape is increasingly volatile, complex and ambiguous, but one thing
is clear and certain: change is underway in this industry, led in part by the federal government.
While there was early research and work on healthcare reform in America that suggested various
models and methods for change, these were only sparsely implemented until the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA) laws were enacted in 2009 and 2010, respectively. However, there has been steady and
continual discussion about the topic, particularly in government forums, for the past three
decades. Bill Clinton focused his 1992 U.S. presidential campaign on healthcare issues, and upon
his election, he quickly formed a task force on healthcare reform headed by then-First Lady
Hillary Rodham Clinton. The proposed reform package, known as the Health Security Act, along
with several revisions and competing proposals, met with opposition and was ultimately
defeated. The 2004 and 2008 presidential elections featured healthcare proposals by both major
political parties, and the topic was discussed and debated by the democratic and republican
candidates. However, significant reform would be elusive until the successful enactment of
ARRA and ACA, notwithstanding the wide opposition across the country. Today, the debate at
the highest government levels continues, and the fate of current healthcare policy and legislation
remains unclear. However, the march toward value-based reimbursement models continues on a
gradual pace forward.
ACA Law
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), signed into law on March 23,
2010, is levying substantial impact on the U.S. healthcare system. Together with the Health Care
and Education Reconciliation Act amendment passed into law seven days later, ACA represents
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the most significant revamp of the U.S. healthcare system since the 1965 enactment of Medicare
to provide health insurance to people aged 65 and older, regardless of income or medical history,
and Medicaid for individuals with limited resources. Under ACA, hospitals and physicians were
to transform their practices financially, technologically, and clinically to drive better health
outcomes, lower costs, and improve their methods of distribution and accessibility (GPO, 2010).
Refer to Appendix A for a high-level summary of the ACA, which in its original form was over
900 pages, and now includes thousands more pages of clarification language.
One section of ACA: Title III - Improving the Quality and Efficiency of Health Care,
prescribes an overhaul of the Medicare reimbursement system. It directs the CMS, under its
newly formed Innovation Center, to design and implement pioneering payment and service
delivery models to reduce costs while at the same time maintaining or improving quality of care.
Traditional Medicare models involving fees paid for each service performed has often resulted in
fragmented care, lacking coordination among providers and healthcare venues. It also rewards
the quantity of services offered by providers rather than the quality of care and outcomes.
BPCI Initiative
One specific ACA directive was for a five-year pilot program on payment bundling to
begin in 2013. The program, which runs through 2018, provides a bulk fixed payment for an
episode of care to be shared by a hospital, physician group, skilled nursing facility and home
health agency rather than the traditional fee-for-service paid for every line item of service from
the various healthcare providers. The episode of care includes the inpatient hospital services,
physician services, outpatient hospital services, and post-acute care services for the period of
time beginning three days prior to a hospitalization and spanning 30-90 days following
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discharge. This is illustrated in Figure 7 below. This innovative reimbursement model is intended
to support better care coordination and better outcomes for patients at lower cost to Medicare.

Figure 7. Illustration of bundled payments as the sum of many healthcare costs.
In 2012, CMS announced the launch of this pilot program, naming it the Bundled
Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) Initiative. BPCI has four broadly defined models of
care, which link payments for multiple services that patients receive during a defined episode of
care. Under this program, healthcare organizations contract for special reimbursement
arrangements that include financial and performance accountability for entire episodes of care.
Over 1500 healthcare provider organizations are participating in or have participated in
one or more of the four models and 48 clinical conditions defined in the BPCI program. The first
cohort began April 1, 2013, and the BPCI program is scheduled to conclude by September 30,
2018. The four models vary by the types of participants (hospitals, physician groups, and postacute care providers), patient diagnoses (from a list such as diabetes, sepsis, and stroke), services
included in the bundle (hospital, post-acute, and readmissions) and method of payment
(prospective and retrospective). Refer to Appendix B for a summary of the BPCI program. The
aim of BPCI is to increase coordination among healthcare providers since only a single,
discounted payment is made by Medicare to the physicians, hospitals, and post-acute care
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providers involved in delivering an episode of care during a specific time period. Because a
bundled payment is typically smaller than the sum of the individual payments, success depends
on reducing costs and increasing efficiency while still providing quality care.
Preliminary results, according to The Lewin Group, who are contracted by CMS to
provide annual evaluation and monitoring reports, show on average that bundled payments lead
to lower costs and higher quality of care (Lewin, 2016). Despite the relatively small sample size
and limited run time of the program, which The Lewin Group is cautionary about, Medicare
continues to rapidly expand the bundled payments model. CMS launched a new mandatory
participation program for over 800 hospitals called Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement
(CJR) – a bundled payment model that started on April 1, 2016, and CMS also established a set
of cardiac episode payment models (EPM) that were to have started in July 2017. However, this
program was beset with delays and a proposal to cancel it, so its fate is unknown at the time of
this writing. That begs the questions: are the early positive results representative and
generalizable across time and across all kinds of hospitals and/or are there important success
factors that must be present?
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this research was to study the efficacy of the Medicare Bundled Payments
for Care Improvement Initiative at a large community hospital in the southeastern part of the
United States. BPCI is a relatively new care and payment model that started in 2013 with as yet
low participation and not enough empirical data available to determine the value of the program.
There are also many variations in the timeframe that participants have been in the program,
organizational profiles, selected clinical groups and episodes, the BPCI model, program waivers,
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design choices, and exclusions. This makes it challenging to draw definitive conclusions as to the
impact of the BPCI Initiative on financial, operational and clinical outcomes.
Significance of the Study
The quantitative and qualitative analysis from this study extends the body of knowledge
about the efficacy of alternative payment models that challenge the traditional fee-for-service
paradigm in the healthcare industry. This could help improve care through economic incentives
that lower costs while maintaining or improving quality of care. There are a plethora of studies
and publications that provide evidence of some of the significant challenges facing healthcare:
1.) skyrocketing costs of healthcare in America coupled with an aging population and an increase
in chronic and acute health conditions; 2.) lack of coordination of care across venues and among
providers, and highly variable outcomes; 3.) lack of patient activation and engagement in their
care management, exacerbated by a lack of information transparency about cost and quality; 4.)
lack of optimized and standardized care pathways and support systems (staffing, technology,
analytics); and 5.) lack of alignment in goals, objectives and economics between providers,
payors, and employers.
However, there are also gaps in the literature which makes this type of research
important. First, there are not enough current and past participants in the BPCI program yet to
determine the true efficacy, as measured by financial, operational and clinical outcomes; or to
generalize the results across the industry. This study adds to the evidence either supporting or not
supporting those findings and may be generalizable to a certain similar segment of the healthcare
provider industry. Second, there are no defined standards for bundled payment program
implementations. Lessons learned from this organization’s experiences may lead to the
development of a model that depicts at least some of the factors that are important in the

11

implementation of a bundled payment initiative, as well as the characteristics of the environment
that may impact the success of the program.
For instance, other empirical studies on bundled payment programs indicated that there
were several key factors in their implementations that impacted the results. A bundled payments
model of implementation success factors and lessons learned may involve elements such as the
following list: proactive preparation, administrative funding for the new program, patient
education, physician training, care pathways redesign, relationships with post-acute care
facilities, patient demographics and acuity, hospital capabilities, marketing, communications,
leadership oversight, engaged staff, hospital facilities, patient engagement, information
technology, gainsharing model, use of consultants for data analysis, collaboration with
physicians, ability to leverage data and analytics to develop higher performing and dynamic care
pathways and teams, beneficiary incentives, discharge planning, case management, care
coordination, use of telehealth and home visits, and follow up appointments.
It is hardly fathomable that an alternative payment model that rewards hospitals that work
together with physicians and other providers to avoid complications, prevent hospital
readmissions, speed recovery and result in lower cost and better outcomes could possibly be
hiding any downside, so this research study might be interesting at the least.
This research study might also set a foundation for future research in this focus area. For
instance, research could be done for bundled payment results for other clinical episodes, for
acute care bundles versus chronic care bundles, for different organization types (profit versus
non-profit, single hospitals versus multi-hospital systems, accountable care organizations (ACO),
physician groups versus hospitals, systems with ownership in multiple venues of care), for
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different patient demographics and acuity, and for additional payors such as commercial
insurance companies.
Research Questions
This study sought to answer four specific research questions:
RQ1 (financial): What is the relationship between a hospital’s participation in a Medicare
bundled payment initiative and the cost of care for patients with lower extremity joint
replacements?
RQ2 (operational): What is the relationship between a hospital’s participation in a
Medicare bundled payment initiative and the utilization of hospital services (length of stay) for
patients with lower extremity joint replacements?
RQ3 (clinical): What is the relationship between a hospital’s participation in a Medicare
bundled payment initiative and quality of care (readmissions) for patients with lower extremity
joint replacements?
RQ4 (descriptive): What factors or characteristics shape a hospital’s participation in a
Medicare bundled payment initiative for patients with lower extremity joint replacements?
To answer the first three research questions which are quantitative in nature, the unit of
analysis was patient-level encounter and claims data over a period of time. The fourth research
question is qualitative in nature and describes the organization’s BPCI program design.
Therefore, the unit of analysis for RQ4 was the hospital being studied.
Research Hypotheses
The following hypotheses formed the basis for this research and are derived from the four
research questions defined earlier.
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H1 (financial): A hospital’s participation in BPCI Model 2 for Medicare patients with
lower extremity joint replacements leads to better financial outcomes as measured by the hospital
charges for the care.
H2 (operational): A hospital’s participation in BPCI Model 2 for Medicare patients with
lower extremity joint replacements leads to better operational outcomes as measured by hospital
length of stay.
H3 (clinical): A hospital’s participation in BPCI Model 2 for Medicare patients with
lower extremity joint replacements leads to better clinical outcomes as measured by hospital
readmissions within 30 days.
H4 (descriptive): A hospital’s participation in BPCI Model 2 for Medicare patients with
lower extremity joint replacements can be characterized by a set of factors that define the
program and lead to success.
Research Design
This study examined the results at one large community hospital in the southeast
participating in Model 2 of the BPCI Initiative since July 1, 2015 for major joint replacement
patients (lower extremity – hips and knees). Patient level data was retrospectively analyzed using
descriptive and inferential statistics to determine if financial, operational and clinical outcomes
improved as result of the BPCI program as compared to similar patient data before the program.
This study contributes to academic and industry business knowledge by statistically describing
empirical BPCI results at a specific type of hospital, presenting a model of BPCI implementation
success factors and lessons learned, and setting the stage for future research in this field of study
that could substantially impact the cost curve for this country’s healthcare.
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Study Site
The focus of this study was one large acute care community hospital located in the
southeast part of the United States. This hospital was chosen for this study in part because it is
significant in size, scope of practice, operational and financial status, leadership and clinical
expertise, resources available, and motivation to execute the BPCI program. The name was
anonymized in this manuscript as a personal choice by the author. It was not requested by the
organization and was only done out of an abundance of caution. The BPCI program
implementation blueprint and the results may contain information that the organization would
not wish to share so openly, and which might possibly impact their competitive advantage in the
industry. While the identity of the organization was likely discernable from various facts
presented here, it will still be referred to anonymously in this study.
At the time of this study, the hospital was a very large not-for-profit, multi-specialty
institution that had a vibrant emergency department, a busy surgery practice, and many other
clinical offerings. It had been passionately serving its community for over a century with a range
of average to excellent scores on most industry standard measures of clinical, operational and
financial performance. This hospital was the only one in the area that served a community with
economic, demographic and health disparities as compared to the others in the region and the
nation. Senior adults (ages 65 and above) represented a considerable portion of the community
with distinctive healthcare needs, 37% of the population were minorities, 19% had a primary
language other than English, 18% did not complete high school, and there were higher than
average poverty rates. Many health conditions, comorbidities and outcomes were comparatively
worse than the region and the nation, including heart diseases, hypertension, respiratory diseases,
cancer, diabetes, obesity, substance abuse, and infectious diseases. This was described in the
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hospital’s publicly-available 2014-2017 Community Health Needs Assessment. These points
were salient because the characteristics of the focus hospital and its patient population may have
had significant impact on the results of the BPCI program.
The relationships that the hospital had with other venues of care and community
physician practice groups were also noteworthy. The hospital did not own or operate any postacute care facilities, and did not directly employ most of the physicians practicing in the hospital.
These were important facts because the BPCI program called for financial, operational and
clinical improvements achieved thru collaborative working relationships with providers across
the spectrum of the episode.
In early 2015, the hospital entered into an agreement with CMS to voluntarily participate
in the BPCI Model 2 Initiative for Medicare patients with major joint replacements of the lower
extremity (LEJR). LEJR patients were those who had hip or knee replacement surgery in a
hospital. The hospital agreed to accept a target price from CMS for each LEJR episode based on
a previous three years of historical costs (FY2010-FY2012) incurred for the hospital patients,
with a three percent discount applied. Model 2 included both the acute hospital care and the postacute care. Therefore, the hospital also agreed to partner with community physicians and postacute care providers, and offered a 50 percent gainsharing plan with the participating physicians,
while the hospital accepted all of the risk. The program began on July 1, 2015 and was
contractually planned for a three-year period ending June 30, 2018. Because Model 2 used a
retrospective payment system, there was a lag in compiling data, so this particular research study
only covered an 18-month BPCI period starting July 1, 2015 and ending December 31, 2016.
The hospital chose to participate in the voluntary BPCI initiative for several reasons.
First, it was seen as an opportunity to learn how to design, manage and measure results for a new
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payment model before it became mandatory, and with a predictable and acceptable level of risk.
Second, it provided a methodology to improve quality of care and reduce costs which could then
be shared with participating physicians. Third, it was an opportunity to engage and collaborate
with patients, physicians and post-acute care providers in the community. In summary, the
hospital BPCI key program parameters estimated at the time of program initiation (July 1, 2015)
were:
•

Model 2 LEJR; physician gainsharing, hospital risk-bearing, 30-day post-acute period

•

Agreement to redesign LEJR care pathways, engage patients and coordinate care

•

Approximately 30 qualified LEJR patients per month (Medicare)

•

10-12 orthopedic surgeons performing LEJR procedures (4-5 hospital employees, 6-7
physicians contracted from another community practice group)

•

Approximately 30 post-acute care providers (20 skilled nursing facilities, 10 home health
agencies)

Definition of Terms
The following healthcare industry concepts, terms related to the BPCI Initiative Model 2,
and measurement variables in this study are defined below. Industry acronyms and terms are also
summarized in Appendix C and Appendix D.
Medicare Program Terminology
Medicare is a federal health insurance program for the elderly (people 65 years of age or
older), certain individuals with disabilities, and people with End Stage Renal Disease. It is an
entitlement program that differs from Medicaid, which is a federal and state welfare program for
the poor. In addition to these federal programs, there are also commercial and private insurance
programs. Medicare has four parts (A, B, C and D) that cover different services.
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Medicare Part A is hospital insurance that covers inpatient hospital stays, care in a skilled
nursing facility, hospice care, and some home healthcare.
Medicare Part B is medical insurance that covers certain doctors' services, outpatient
care, medical supplies, and preventive services.
Medicare Part C is a group of plans known as Medicare Advantage that are offered by
private companies contracted with Medicare to provide Part A and Part B benefits.
Medicare Part D is prescription drug coverage offered by insurance companies and other
private companies approved by Medicare.
Hospital Payment Terminology
Fee for Service is the traditional way for hospitals and providers to be paid for care
rendered where each service is charged separately and payment is received for each service.
Pay for Performance is a more contemporary hospital and provider payment system that
links payment to quality and efficiency as an incentive to improve care and decrease costs.
Retrospective Payment System is a system where the payment for a specific service is
based on actual costs incurred.
Prospective Payment System is a system where the payment for a specific service is
predetermined and not based on actual costs incurred.
Cost is the actual amount that the hospital or provider actually incurs to provide a service.
Charge is the amount that the hospital or provider bills the insurance payor for a service
and this may not be equal to the cost of the service.
Reimbursement is the amount an insurance payor, such as Medicare, actually pays the
hospital or provider for a service and it may not be the same as the costs incurred or the charges
billed.
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BPCI Terminology
Bundled Payment is a predetermined target price for all of the items and services
provided for the episode of care. A retrospective reconciliation compares this target price to the
total fee for service payments made by CMS to the providers. If the total fee for service
payments is less than the target price, the hospital receives the difference from CMS. If the total
fee for service payments exceeds the target price, the hospital must pay the difference to CMS.
Beneficiary is a patient scheduled or admitted for the applicable clinical episode (LEJR in
this study) who is eligible for Medicare Part A and enrolled in Part B, does not have End Stage
Renal Disease and is not enrolled in any managed care plan.
Episode of Care includes the pre-admission test, patient’s hospital care, post-acute care,
and all related services which ends 30 days after initial hospital discharge.
Post-Acute Care includes services from providers of care from the date of hospital
discharge until 30 days after. This includes skilled nursing facilities, home health, inpatient and
outpatient rehabilitation and follow-up services, hospital readmissions, and emergency care
visits.
Study Variables
Financial outcomes are assessed as the total cost of an episode of care and measured in
two components: hospital care cost and post-acute care cost. Financial outcomes are considered
better if the total cost of an episode of care during the BPCI program is less than that of a similar
episode of care not in the BPCI program.
Operational outcomes are assessed as the utilization of services during an episode of care
and measured in two components: patient length of stay in the hospital and patient length of stay
in a post-acute care facility. Operational outcomes are considered better if the utilization of an
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episode of care during the BPCI program is less than that of a similar episode of care not in the
BPCI program.
Clinical outcomes are assessed as the quality of care during an episode of care and
measured in two components: readmissions to the hospital and visits to the emergency
department during the 30 days following the initial hospital discharge. Clinical outcomes are
considered better if the 30-day readmissions of an episode of care during the BPCI program is
less than that of a similar episode of care not in the BPCI program.
Assumptions and Limitations
This study was primarily quantitative and the author accepted the philosophical
assumptions of positivism. The research method selected, retrospective data analysis, was
assumed to be the best approach to answer the research questions. Furthermore, the study results
might be generalizable through statistical probability, although the quantitative analysis scope
was limited to a single hospital, one year of program participation, and a relatively small sample
out of a much larger population of data. It was assumed that the sample was representative of the
population and that the bundled payment reimbursement model would continue to be important
in the healthcare industry for some time. The study was intentionally delimited by investigating
only certain factors that may have impacted the results, such as hospital costs, length of stay and
readmissions. It was not feasible to consider other factors, such as patient, surgeon and postacute facility profiles as well as longitudinal program changes, due to data availability and
research time allotted.
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Organization of Dissertation
This research manuscript is organized as a traditional dissertation with five main
chapters: Introduction, Literature Review, Methods, Results, Discussion and Conclusions,
followed by supporting reference material.
Chapter One (this chapter) introduced the research problem and background, described
the purpose and significance of the study, listed the research questions and hypotheses, and
summarized the research design and study site. It concluded with definitions of relevant
terminology, and a brief discussion of the study assumptions and limitations.
Chapter Two is a Literature Review that contains the search description, conceptual or
theoretical framework, and a review of current and prior research on the topic.
Chapter Three is the Methods section that contains the research design, research
questions and hypotheses, the study setting, participants, population and sample, data collection
method and data analysis techniques.
Chapter Four is the Results section that contains the findings from the statistical analysis,
organized by the research hypotheses.
Chapter Five is the Discussion and Conclusions section that contains a summary of
findings, conclusions about the hypotheses, a discussion about the research, suggestions for
future research and a brief conclusion.
Following the five main chapters are a list of references cited in this manuscript, several
appendices with supporting information including statistical output and other reference material,
and a short author biography.
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CHAPTER TWO:
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction
This chapter presents literature on the topic of bundled payments that served as the
foundation for this study. It begins with a description of the literature search and selection
process. This is followed by a brief historical review of the Medicare program from its inception
in the 1960s to the present, hospital economics, and alternative payment models. The next
section delves into the BPCI program, its design and objectives, program elements that are
discussed in studies of actual implementations, and a short discussion on the gainsharing and
risk-bearing aspects of healthcare payment systems. Finally, a summary of BPCI results to date
are presented, including those from a series of published empirical studies on value-based
reimbursement systems and recent studies on BPCI implementations. It concludes with a
discussion on the many open challenges with bundled payments, and a summary of the
contributions and gaps found in the literature.
Search Strategy and Methods
An extensive search was conducted for each sub-topic included in this literature review
chapter using the University of South Florida online library search tools and databases. Google
Scholar, U.S. Government sites such as the Department of Health and Human Services and the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and healthcare industry journals such as The
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Journal of Arthroplasty were also used. Finally, a review of the reference lists from several key
studies and articles also yielded new leads.
Search terms were specific to each sub-topic and included combinations of words and
phrases, including: healthcare, hospital, physician, payment, reimbursement, cost, quality,
finance, Medicare, value-based, fee for service, pay for performance, alternative payment model,
bundled payment, BPCI, length of stay, readmissions, outcome, care redesign, gainsharing, risk
bearing, and financial risk.
This search strategy yielded a large amount of literature, and therefore, screening and
scoring methods were employed to narrow the volume. A manual review of the title, abstract,
keywords, and sometimes full text successfully screened out a good portion of the results. A
scoring system was applied to the remaining material that gave higher weight to publications in
peer-reviewed journals, studies that used quantitative and statistical analysis methods, articles
published in the recent five to ten years, authors and journals that are well-known and respected
in the healthcare industry, and some case studies that discussed empirical experiences with
bundled payments.
Brief History
Medicare Program
Medicare was created in 1965 as an amendment to the Social Security Act to provide
publicly financed health insurance to the elderly at a time when older Americans found it
virtually impossible to get private health insurance coverage. This made access to healthcare an
entitlement for Americans aged 65 and older. It was implemented in two components: Part A
which paid for hospital and nursing home service, and Part B which paid for physician and
outpatient services. Nineteen million Americans enrolled in the program when services began on
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July 1, 1966 (Shi & Singh, 2015). This triggered a meteoric growth in access and therefore,
demand for healthcare services. As explained by economic theory and moral hazards, broader
health insurance lowered consumer out-of-pocket costs, leading to higher utilization of
healthcare services. This contributed to explosive inflation of healthcare spending and the
Medicare financing problems that began soon after it was formed. National health expenditures
began to increase sharply, jumping 78% in the first five years and another 71% in the next five
years (Shi & Singh, 2015). For over 40 years now, policy makers have worked to develop
creative solutions to curb this growth. Today more than 57 million Americans depend on
Medicare for their health insurance at a cost of over $600 billion annually. See Figure 8 below.

Figure 8. U.S. government spending on healthcare. (Source: PGPF, 2017)
Healthcare Economics
The healthcare finance structure is enormously complex compared to single-payor
systems of countries like Canada and Great Britain. In America, both public and private payors
play significant roles and numerous reimbursement methods exist, including retrospective and
prospective reimbursement systems, cost-plus, fee for service, pay for performance, value-based
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models, and bundled payments (package pricing) – applied to hospitals (Part A) and/or
physicians (Part B) (Shi & Singh, 2015).
Medicare began with a cost-plus method for hospital (Part A) reimbursement, which used
a formula to calculate a per-patient-day rate based on hospital costs plus an overhead amount.
This was a retrospective reimbursement model because it was calculated by evaluating costs
after the services were performed. Under this system, reimbursement was directly related to
length of stay, services provided and the cost of those services. There was no incentive to contain
costs or become more efficient. In fact, there were incentives to provide more services than
necessary to increase profits (James & Poulsen, 2016). Because of this paradox built into the
retrospective cost-plus model, Medicare largely abandoned it for hospital reimbursements in
1983 and adopted a prospective system.
In contrast to retrospective, the prospective system uses criteria to determine the
reimbursement before the services are delivered, typically based on diagnosis-related groups
(DRG). A DRG groups together principal diagnoses that are expected to require similar hospital
resources. This decreases spending by curbing over-utilization abuses and allows Medicare to
better predict healthcare spending. It also incentivizes hospitals to reduce costs so it could
increase profits for itself.
Fee for service is one of the oldest reimbursement methods and it is still used today for
physician services (Part B) and some outpatient hospital services. Each unit of service is
separately itemized on one or more bills. Much like cost-plus and other retrospective systems,
some policy makers suggested that the fee for service payment model incentivized hospitals and
physicians to increase their income by increasing the volume of patients and number of services
without regard for the necessity or appropriateness of those services (James & Poulsen, 2016).
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Conversely, bundled fees include a number of services in one price. This type of package
pricing reduces the incentive to provide non-essential services. More recently, the ACA directed
Medicare to develop “value-based purchasing” methods that incorporate pay for performance.
The goal is to reduce reimbursement while improving quality and efficiency. Most organizations
are required to report quality data to the CMS, or face penalties. Pay for performance links
reimbursement to these quality and efficiency measures as an incentive to improve them (Shi &
Singh 2015).
Medicare trust funds have been, for many years, running in a deficit mode and on a
trajectory toward insolvency. In addition, healthcare expenditures have continued to shift from
the private to the public sector. This trend is accelerating as shown in Figure 9 below.

Figure 9. Private and government share of healthcare spending trend. (Source: PGPF, 2017)
Nearly since the inception of Medicare, policy makers were already concerned with the
uncontrolled growth in costs and were proposing innovate ways to curb it. Research has shown
that bundled payments can align incentives for providers, including hospitals, post-acute care
providers, physicians, and other practitioners, allowing them to work closely together across all
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specialties and settings. The theory posits that care from providers who collaborate to deliver
services to a patient though the entire episode of care will be well-coordinated and result in
improved quality (CMS, 2013).
Alternative Payment Models
The idea of bundled payments is not new to the healthcare industry, with examples
documented more than 30 years ago. In fact, when Medicare adopted the prospective payment
system in 1983, it effectively shifted the cost risks of providing care onto hospitals. Although not
officially termed bundled payments since it did not cover entire episodes of care, this system
created a set or fixed fee schedule for specific diagnoses. Unfortunately, this was applied only to
hospitals and not to physicians, who continued to be paid as fee for service, and therefore
behaviors did not change. Much work was done in this area to improve cost efficiency among
physicians including instituting a “usual and customary charges” approach and later a “relative
value scale” (Andrawis et al., 2016).
One of the first attempts at implementing bundled payments was in 1984 at The Texas
Heart Institute. There, cardiovascular surgeries were offered in a single package price, which was
lower than the average Medicare payment. This was deemed a success, as the plan lowered costs,
while still maintaining high quality and outcomes. The first bundled payment in orthopedics
occurred in 1987 at a Michigan hospital where a surgeon offered a 2-year warranty for knee
arthroscopy. Again, this was considered a success as it reduced costs (Andrawis et al., 2016;
Anoushiravani & Iorio, 2016; Froimson et al., 2014).
In 1991, the Health Care Financing Administration (now known as CMS) believed that as
long as physicians operated under a different payment system from hospitals, they would
continue to be incentivized to use more services and not less. So, they launched the Medicare
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Participating Heart Bypass Center Demonstration, a five-year pilot with three hospitals to pay a
flat fee for all inpatient as well as physician services for two DRGs. The cost savings were
significant however, the providers were not satisfied with the administration of the program and
it was never extended (Anoushiravani & Iorio, 2016).
Several other experimental models emerged over the next decade with mixed results. A
2008 report to Congress by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission discussed that
hospitals and physicians should be financially motivated to coordinate care, limit services and
improve cost efficiency (MedPac, 2008). Shortly thereafter, the Acute Care Episode (ACE)
demonstration program was launched for some cardiovascular and orthopedic services. Though
small in scope, all participating hospitals reduced the overall episode costs by 10-15%
(Anoushiravani & Iorio, 2016).
Despite the examples of success, bundled payments never became mainstream until it
was required by law with ACA. The 2010 passage of the ACA brought with it the creation of the
Innovation Center under the CMS (CMMI) to develop and administer innovative healthcare
payment and service delivery models. It has a growing portfolio of pilot projects that, according
to the CMMI website (https://innovation.cms.gov/), “aim to achieve better care for patients,
smarter spending and healthier communities”. Currently, 30 percent of Medicare payments flow
through alternative payment models including episode-based payment initiatives (such as BPCI
and CJR) or Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs). CMS has indicated it intends to raise that
level to over 50 percent by 2018 (CMS, 2016a). Refer to Figure 10 below.
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Figure 10. Brief history of bundled payments in healthcare.
BPCI Program Description
Design and Objectives
Bundled Payments for Care Improvement was designed initially to be a three-year
voluntary national program with a two-year extension option. Its two main objectives were to
implement an alternative payment model that would 1.) improve patient care, and 2.) lower costs
to Medicare. And importantly, under this program, the problem resulting from fee for service
reimbursement would be addressed: fragmented care with minimal coordination across providers
and healthcare settings (CMS, 2016a). The focus is on outcomes for an episode of care, rather
than separate services in care delivery. Providers are rewarded for increasing quality and
reducing costs, and penalized if costs exceed a set amount. The financial risk under BPCI shifted
to the care providers. The hospital (in most cases) is compensated for the entire episode of care
(from 3 days prior to hospitalization to 90 days post discharge) at a rate discounted 2-3% from
historical levels (the target price). If the total cost of care for the episode exceeds the target price,
the hospital is responsible for the difference. If the total cost is less than the target, the savings
can be shared among the providers.
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Because the program was voluntary and intended to attract much broader participation
than previous demonstration initiatives, it was designed with four models of bundled payments
tied to an inpatient hospital admission. The models varied by the types of providers involved
(hospitals, physicians, post-acute care providers), types of procedures (48 diagnoses to choose
from), method of payment and reconciliation (retrospective, fee for service, prospective) and the
episode length of time after the hospitalization (30, 60 or 90 days). Of the four, Model 2 emerged
as the most widely adopted, accounting for more than three quarters of the episodes and almost
half of the provider participants, possibly because there is no downside risk for physicians – only
for hospitals (Lewin, 2016). This model was also favored because of the retrospective payment
aspect with after-the-fact reconciliation.
Orthopedic Focus
Much like some of the early bundled payment demonstration projects from the 1980s
forward, the orthopedic procedures were widely selected in the BPCI initiative. During the first
year of the program, 74 percent of the Model 2 episodes were for major joint replacements of the
lower extremity – the focus of this study (Lewin, 2016). Some of the reasons cited for this
tendency are that orthopedic procedures are elective in most cases; they are among the most
commonly performed surgeries; they are significantly expensive; and they depend heavily on
post- acute care services. In addition, these procedures use implantable devices and surgical
supplies, making them natural targets for standardization, vendor price negotiation, and overall
cost savings initiatives. Refer to the Figure 11 below for illustration.
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Figure 11. Illustration of lower extremity joint replacement costs. (Source: Caradigm, 2016)
Program Elements
Bundling payments for services that patients receive across a single episode of care is one
way to encourage doctors, hospitals and other healthcare providers to work together to better
coordinate care for patients before, during and after their hospitalization. The CMS application
for acceptance into the BPCI program required certain design and administration aspects to be
addressed, giving wide latitude for organizations to customize an implementation and operational
model. Keys requirements were:
1. Build infrastructure to support the implementation including executive leadership,
team, governance, information systems, and administrative processes
2. Generate and use actionable data including approaches to share it with stakeholders
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3. Improve processes and redesign care including care pathways and protocols,
enhancement of care delivery, patient activation, engagement and risk management,
care coordination, and system changes to support care
4. Meet terms and conditions of BPCI including reporting quality measures and
notifying patients of the program
Many studies point to these design elements as critical success factors in getting
prepared, operationalizing a bundled payments program, and moreover delivering on the
objectives of high-quality care at the lowest cost. No standard blueprint seems to exist to guide
organizations. Table 1 below shows 13 different program strategies gleaned from recent
literature. While each has subtle nuances, there are a number of common themes: having the
right leadership setting the vision and championing the program; hospital and physicians in true
partnership and alignment; patient engagement and education throughout the care journey;
transparency and communication with all care providers and patients; metrics defined and data to
support it coupled with systems and staff to manage and share it; and re-designed care pathways
that are continuously monitored and improved.
Table 1. Literature review of bundled payment program implementation strategies.
Study Author(s)
and Date

Summary of Knowledge Detailed Information
Contribution

Bozic, 2015

10-Step Process

Assess cultural readiness; Leadership champions;
Define episodes; Define performance metrics; Map
episode of care; Measure costs; Identify process
improvement areas; Re-engineer care to improve
outcomes; Price the episode and market it; Iterate

Caillouette, 2015

Critical Success Factor

True partnership and alignment between physicians
and hospital through education, shared equity and
governance, defined and tracked metrics

DiGioia III et al.,
2016

7 Segments of Care

Process maps for each of 7 segments of care to
identify true costs (activity-based costing): PreOp/Office; Pre-Op Testing and Consults; Day of
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Study Author(s)
and Date

Summary of Knowledge Detailed Information
Contribution
Surgery/OR; PACU; Inpatient Stay; Therapy; Follow
Up Visits

Edwards & Barnes,
2016

Steps to Avoid Outliers
and Minimize Variation

Appropriate patient selection; Set patient
expectations; Pre-operative evaluation; Joint
Academy pre-operative education; Communication;
Joint Hotline for patients

Elbuluk & O'Neill,
2017

Implementation Success
Factors

Establish vision and strategy; Define the bundle;
Integration with providers; Tailored orthopedic care
suites, Physician education, Transparency

Froemke et al., 2015 3 Phases of Care

Pre-operative: patient education, set expectations;
Operative: reduce impact of key cost drivers; Postoperative: discharge home, follow-up and rapid
PT/OT

Froimson, 2015

Complete Care Program

Patients are managed pre-operatively; Patient and
family are prepared and educated; Physician
leadership is activated; Cultural shift must occur with
the teams

Haas et al., 2015

3 Keys for Successful
Bundling

Data on outcomes and costs; Proactive management
of patients; Alignment of physicians and hospitals

Kim & Iorio, 2017

5 Clinical Pillars

Optimizing patient selection; Optimizing care
coordination; Using multimodal pain management
protocol; Optimizing blood management;
Minimizing post-acute facility utilization

Pizzo & Ryan, 2016

4 Strategies for
Obtain needed data; Assess data thoroughly;
Succeeding with Bundled Understand what is in the bundle; Engage
Payments
stakeholders

Rana, 2016

Framework to
Successfully Introduce
APM

APM design; Building a dedicated team; Identifying
and implementing performance metrics;
Incorporating risk adjustment intake; Clinical care
pathways, protocols and care coordination

Schutzer, 2015

2 Primary Challenges –
How to Get Started

Right leadership – physicians, hospital and
alignment; Credible data – cost, quality, outcomes

Slover, 2016a

Patient Engagement is
Critical

Patient education; Patient engagement; Shared
decision making; “Skin in the game”

Gainsharing and Risk-Bearing
Bundled payments introduced changes in the traditional motivating factors with
gainsharing, risk-bearing, quality outcome goals, and cost targets. Gainsharing has roots dating
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back to at least the 1930s when Joe Scanlon devised a program to revitalize the steel industry by
motivating staff with the promise of shared savings and gains (Anoushiravani & Nunley, 2017).
However, hospital-physician gainsharing in most forms had long been illegal, as there was
concern that physicians would steer patients (sometimes, healthy patients) to specific hospitals
for financial advantage. Over time, gainsharing programs in the healthcare industry, particularly
in alternative payment model programs, have been accepted with specific design features and
safeguards. This is certainly true for the BPCI program where gainsharing incentives are
expected to align hospitals, physicians and post-acute care providers in the redesign of care to
achieves savings and improve quality (CMS, 2013).
Two stipulations in BPCI Model 2 are that 1.) the hospital bears the downside risk and
physician do not bear any risk, and 2.) gains may be shared with physicians if the hospital’s
program design includes it, but the gains are capped at 50 percent of the CMS physician
payment. There is considerable literature and research on employee compensation models that
include elements of risk and gain, especially in manufacturing, but more recently in service
industries such as healthcare. The topic is complex and somewhat beyond the scope of this study,
however, it bears mentioning that this is likely a very important aspect to the success or failure of
a bundled payment program. More specifically, whether the lack of risk bearing is impactful and
whether the amount of potential gains is large enough to change behaviors. Two studies indicate
that hospital-physician relationships are challenging in that their goals only partly overlap and a
partnership requires more than just financial incentives (Burns & Muller, 2008; Lee & Cosgrove,
2014). Alexander et al. (2001) and Gomez-Mejia et al. (2000) published studies about risk
assumption and gainsharing in healthcare and they highlight differences in impact between an
individual physician’s assumption of risk and gains, and that of a physician group. Emphasizing
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individual performance can generate an effect of reducing alignment between physicians and the
health system – the opposite of the BPCI objective to create a culture of shared fate.
Findings from Literature
CMS BPCI Results
With over 1500 providers participating in the voluntary bundled payments program, the
first annual evaluation report issued in February 2015 covering quantitative data for only one
quarter of program participation (October – December 2013) showed slight improvements in cost
and quality data, but not statistically significant (Lewin, 2015). Specifically, for model 2, there
were 9 hospitals who performed 698 LEJR episodes in the quarter. Although none of the results
were statistically significant, the three outcome measures all declined, as desired. Length of stay
decreased from 4.4 to 4.3 days, costs for both hospital and physicians decreased slightly, and
readmissions rates fell from 8.6% to 6.7%.
The second annual evaluation report was issued in August 2016 covering quantitative
data for five quarters of program participation (October 2013 – December 2014). Again, the
results showed incremental improvements in cost and quality data (Lewin, 2016). By this time,
there were 110 hospitals in Model 2 with over 42,500 episodes, of which 82 hospital participated
in 17,000 LEJR episodes. The majority of the Model 2 hospitals were large, not-for-profit,
teaching hospitals in urban, higher median income areas. Again, across all episodes, there were
not any statistically significant changes in cost or quality. However, for LEJR, there were mixed
results, statistically. Payments decreased 3% ($864/episode), skilled nursing facility (SNF)
length of stay decreased by 1.3 days, and institutional post-acute care (SNF and other inpatient)
use decreased 4.9%. There was no statistically significant change in readmissions rate though. A
closing remark in the Lewin (2016) report affirms the inconclusive results:
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“We remain limited in our ability to estimate the impact of the initiative under most
Model and episode combinations because of insufficient sample size and the limited time
the initiative has been underway.”
Empirical Study Results
Several other published studies with empirical results from specific providers in the joint
replacement BPCI program also validate those initial Lewin report findings – some cost and
quality improvements, along with some other interesting observations, such as significant
changes in discharge disposition. Results from seven published research papers are shown in
Table 2 below. All participated in the LEJR episodes early in the program (2013) and all present
positive and similar outcomes of lower costs, length of stay and readmissions, despite challenges
and relatively low number of patients.
Table 2. Literature review of bundled payment program results.
Study Author
and Date

Study
Data
Cost
Parameters Collection Results

Bolz & Iorio, 2016
Iorio et al., 2016

LEJR
90 days
n=721

Doran & Zabinski,
2015

Readmit
Results

Discharge
Disposition

2013-2014 ↓ 8.1-17% ↓ 1.2

↓ 6%

↑ 8% Home
↑ 34% HH
↓ 41% IP

LEJR
30 days
n=559

2013-2014 ↓ 9-9.5%

↓ 1.1-1.4

↓ 0.5%

↓ 33% IP

Dummit et al., 2016

LEJR
30/90 days
n=31,700

2013-2015 ↓ 10.8%

↓ 0.5

No
statistical
difference

↑ 8% Home

Edwards et al., 2017

LEJR
90 days
n=461

2013-2014 ↓ 14%

↓ 1.24

↓ 6%

N/A

Froemke et al., 2015

LEJR
90 days
n=317

2013

↓ 0.52

N/A

↑ 9.6% Home
↓ 7.4% HH
↓ 2.2% SNF

Murphy et al, 2016

LEJR
30 days

2013-2014 ↓ 9-17%

N/A

↓ 5%

N/A

↓ 6%
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LOS
(days)

Factors of Influence
A number of published studies discussed various contributing factors that are believed to
impact the bundled payment outcomes. Hospital case mix was shown to be one such concern.
Case mix represents the diversity, clinical complexity, and the amount of resources required for
the patient population in the hospital. For hospitals that treat a disproportionate number of
patients with severe or highly complex problems, bundled payments that are not risk-adjusted
and rely on regional target prices could be penalized (Fehring, 2016; Ellimoottil, 2016). For
LEJR orthopedic patients, this means having a higher ratio of DRG 469 (major joint replacement
with complications or comorbidities) than DRG 470. In addition, Rozell et al. (2016) concluded
that patients with certain chronic kidney, pulmonary and liver diseases should be excluded from
alternative payment models.
Several other studies found more factors that might influence bundled payment financial
and clinical outcomes. Patients with lower socio-economic status (SES) were found, in at least
one study, to have longer length of stay, higher readmissions, and more discharges to higher-cost
rehabilitation facilities. The study concluded that risk adjustment models should also include
patient SES (Courtney et al., 2017). Patient characteristics such as age, body mass index, and the
presence of bone fractures were shown to significantly increase the cost of care and length of
stay (Clement et al., 2016; Newman et al., 2017). Even the hospital geographic region, profit
status, and surgical day of the week were shown in some studies to cause significant variation in
cost and care (Hall et al., 2016; Newman et al., 2017). Finally, as the post discharge period of
time is an important part of the bundled payment episode, two studies discussed post-acute care
patterns and strategies to manage utilization rates and pointed to this as a key component of any
bundled payment program (Slover, 2016b; Weeks et al., 2017).
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Program Challenges
In spite of proven successes with bundled payment programs, there continue to be
challenges, opportunities, and flaws in the current and previous value-based payment systems.
As the healthcare paradigm is complex, Porter and Kaplan (2016) and Porter and Lee (2013)
discussed a host of objections that have emerged and suggested counter points to each. Some of
the challenges raised include: it is difficult to define a condition to be covered by a bundled
payment, it is complicated to implement a bundled payment program, it is difficult to hold
providers accountable and unrealistic to expect them to work together, outcomes are difficult to
measure, cost information is lacking, providers will cherry-pick patients for the best outcomes,
bundled payments will encourage over-treatment, and they will trigger excessive price
competition. To all of these, Porter and Kaplan suggest that while much work remains on
bundled payment implementation, it is the way forward for healthcare.
The literature from the empirical studies above also raise other questions and challenges,
with a partial list presented here:
•

Providers who have already invested significantly in coordination of care and
controlling costs seem to be penalized by the historically-based target pricing system.

•

Providers might be tempted to select patients with lower acuity who are more apt to
have better outcomes and push unhealthier patients to other providers.

•

Hospitals that treat medically complex patients might be penalized by bundled
payments if outcome goals are not risk-adjusted appropriately. Many other patient
demographic, socio-economic, and health factors might also be significant.

•

Length of stay targets weighted in the bundled payments program might encourage
providers to shift patients from the hospital venue to post-acute care, home health or
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home too soon. The trade-off for lower length of hospital stay could be higher
readmissions.
•

A parallel activity that is essential in achieving bundled payment goals is internal cost
control. LEJR procedures use expensive supplies and implantable devices that are
often not standardized and/or price-negotiated because hospital and physicians have
historically not been aligned in objectives.

•

Bundled payment programs require an investment in resources, such as financial,
staffing, technology, and analytics. This might unduly burden small or standalone
hospitals and/or small-scale implementations. Bundled payments might favor
Accountable Care Organizations, Clinically Integrated Networks, or other large
institutions.

•

The challenge for the leaders of healthcare organizations is enormous to shape and
align the web of incentives in ways that promote the goals while avoiding over- or
under-provision of services. They must develop incentives that are both effective and
ethical to motivate physicians and other providers to collaborate to find opportunities
to improve efficiency and coordinate care, while also exposing them to risk and
potential revenue losses.

Literature Contributions and Gaps
As demonstrated in the foregoing literature review, there is considerable attention
being paid to the serious problems of increasing healthcare spending and lacking care
coordination that hinders improved outcomes. Both private and public organizations have
tackled these issues for many years with numerous alternate payment models and care
delivery systems. These have often been met with some success, however they have not been
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widely adopted due to a myriad of challenges. Now, under the ACA law, the bundled
payment method is again being demonstrated by CMS in the BPCI Initiative. Early results
seem to point in the positive direction for cost and quality improvements, however, this is
based on a fairly small sample of participants and limited timeframe of the study.
Furthermore, the literature reveals that an implementation model or template does not exist
and that leads to even more of a challenge for organizations to adapt to the new payment and
care delivery system and realize positive results swiftly. These and many other open issues
and questions presented here remain to be answered and are signals that additional research is
called for.
Summary
This survey of the literature on the topic of bundled payments laid the foundation for
the current research that was conducted to observe one hospital’s firsthand experiences with
BPCI. The study results and implementation models found in the literature were useful in
understanding how the bundled payment model relates to cost and care quality outcomes.
This literature review ultimately informed, helped develop, and refined the approach to this
study that is presented in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER THREE:
METHODS

Introduction
This chapter describes the research design and methodology used in this study. It begins
with a review of the research questions and hypotheses, and then presents the research design
and the focus of the study. Next is a discussion on the population and sample characteristics and
the data sources. Then the dataset preparation procedures are presented, as well as a discussion
on the variables of interest. Finally, it delves into the data analysis tools and techniques used, a
brief discussion on the qualitative aspect of this study, and it concludes with legal and ethical
considerations in healthcare data research.
Research Questions
The objectives of this study were to answer four specific research questions:
1. Research Question 1 (financial): What is the relationship between a hospital’s
participation in a Medicare bundled payment initiative and the cost of care for
patients with lower extremity joint replacements?
2. Research Question 2 (operational): What is the relationship between a hospital’s
participation in a Medicare bundled payment initiative and the utilization of hospital
services (length of stay) for patients with lower extremity joint replacements?

41

3. Research Question 3 (clinical): What is the relationship between a hospital’s
participation in a Medicare bundled payment initiative and quality of care
(readmissions) for patients with lower extremity joint replacements?
4. Research Question 4 (descriptive): What factors or characteristics shape a hospital’s
participation in a Medicare bundled payment initiative for patients with lower
extremity joint replacements?
Study Hypotheses
To answer the research questions posed in this study, the null and alternative hypotheses
to be tested were:
1. Hypothesis 1 (financial)
H1o:

A hospital’s participation in BPCI Model 2 for Medicare patients with lower
extremity joint replacements does not lead to better financial outcomes as
measured by the hospital charges for the care.

H1a:

A hospital’s participation in BPCI Model 2 for Medicare patients with lower
extremity joint replacements leads to better financial outcomes as measured
by the hospital charges for the care.

2. Hypothesis 2 (operational)
H2o:

A hospital’s participation in BPCI Model 2 for Medicare patients with lower
extremity joint replacements does not lead to better operational outcomes as
measured by hospital length of stay.

H2a:

A hospital’s participation in BPCI Model 2 for Medicare patients with lower
extremity joint replacements leads to better operational outcomes as measured
by hospital length of stay.
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3. Hypothesis 3 (clinical)
H3o:

A hospital’s participation in BPCI Model 2 for Medicare patients with lower
extremity joint replacements does not lead to better clinical outcomes as
measured by hospital readmissions within 30 days.

H3a:

A hospital’s participation in BPCI Model 2 for Medicare patients with lower
extremity joint replacements leads to better clinical outcomes as measured by
hospital readmissions within 30 days.

4. Hypothesis 4 (descriptive)
H4o:

A hospital’s participation in BPCI Model 2 for Medicare patients with lower
extremity joint replacements cannot be characterized by a set of factors that
define the program and lead to success.

H4a:

A hospital’s participation in BPCI Model 2 for Medicare patients with lower
extremity joint replacements can be characterized by a set of factors that
define the program and lead to success.

Research Design
To best answer the study questions, the research design selected was a retrospective
quantitative analysis of data. The data came from two sources, but it was principally collected by
the study hospital during a quasi-experimental BPCI initiative conducted in the hospital setting
where this phenomenon of interest actually occurred. As conducted by the hospital, this was not
a true experiment because the patients enrolled in the BPCI initiative were not randomly
selected, but rather they met a set of pre-determined criteria. The internal validity can also be
challenged because the hospital environment is very complex and involves many extraneous
variables that could not be controlled (such as patient demographics and comorbidities, attending
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physicians and surgeons, and post-acute care providers). However, the external validity is likely
very high since the hospital represents a typical community hospital environment, not unlike
many in America, characterized by such factors as size, patient volume, case mix, and payer mix.
The analysis and observations that came from this study might be generalizable to other
healthcare provider organizations, other patient populations, and other settings or contexts where
alternative payment models are being considered.
The intent of this retrospective data analysis was to test causality or explanatory
relationships to determine if applying the BPCI program elements to a specific patient population
(treatment group) lead to improved financial, operational and/or clinical outcomes. The treatment
included a variety of process changes that were implemented specifically to support the BPCI
program at the commencement of the program in July 2015. These included redesigned LEJR
care protocols, patient education, clinical team training, care coordination among all providers,
increased follow-up care, and data analytics. The research study analyzed the treatment group
data as compared to a control group that consisted of a similar patient population as in the
treatment group, but not treated.
The treatment group consisted of all patients enrolled in the BPCI program for the first 18
months of participation. The control group consisted of all similar patients in the 18 months just
prior to the BPCI program. The patient selection parameters for the treatment and the control
groups were the same, except for the actual experimental treatment of participation in the BPCI
program. There were also implicit controls in this study design. During the timeframe before and
after the BPCI Initiative, there were no substantial changes in the hospital environment, the
organization size, facilities, number of admissions, physicians and staff, post-acute care facilities,
patient demographics, case mix, and number of cases of LEJR.
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Study Setting
The data for this study was from a large acute care community hospital located in the
southeast part of the United States. The hospital was a not-for-profit, multi-specialty, and very
large single-site hospital with over 850 inpatient beds, more than 130 emergency department
beds, and a large surgical department with over 20 operating rooms. Its LEJR surgery practice
had consistent volume, with approximately 82 hip or knee replacement patients per month. There
were 10-12 orthopedic surgeons performing these procedures, and there were about 36 postacute care providers where patients were typically discharged to for continuing care. They were
comprised of approximately 20 skilled nursing facilities, 12 home health agencies, and smaller
numbers of inpatient and outpatient rehabilitation centers, and short-term and intermediate-term
care facilities. These numbers fluctuated over time, albeit minimally, as these physicians,
patients and organizations entered and exited the community.
The hospital had a dynamic leadership team and a culture of continuous improvement,
and that led to their voluntary participation in the BPCI Model 2 Initiative, beginning July 1,
2015 for a three-year period ending June 30, 2018. Because Model 2 uses a retrospective
payment system, there was a lag in compiling data, so this particular research study only covered
an 18-month BPCI period starting July 1, 2015 and ending December 31, 2016.
Population and Sample
The study participant sample (n=1147) included all Medicare patients admitted to the
hospital for hip or knee surgery 18 months prior to the BPCI program through 18 months after
the BPCI program. This sample was divided into two groups: a treatment group (n=525) of
patients in the BPCI program, and a control group (n=622) of similar patients from the prior time
period. Of particular note is a decision that was made to include only Medicare patients in this
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study and exclude non-Medicare patients that, if included, would have yielded a more robust
research design with four groups instead of two. This exclusion was done for four reasons. First,
post-acute care cost data was not available from CMS for non-Medicare patients because they
were not enrolled in the program. Second, there were significant demographic differences (age,
complications, and surgery type) between Medicare and non-Medicare patients that would have
made it difficult to draw conclusions. Third, it would not be possible to isolate the care patterns
between Medicare and non-Medicare patients because the same clinical, business, and support
staff interacted with both. Fourth, outcomes and discharge patterns were different across the
board with non-Medicare patients because they are typically younger and healthier, according to
literature presented in Chapter Two of this manuscript.
Treatment Group: All patients enrolled in the BPCI program from July 1, 2015 –
December 31, 2016 with the following qualifications: insured by Medicare, admitted to the
hospital for Clinical Group-surgical orthopedic excluding spine and Clinical Episode-major joint
replacement of the lower extremity in Diagnosis Related Group-469 or 470.
Control Group: (Similar patients, prior timeframe). All patients from January 1, 2014 –
June 30, 2015 with the following qualifications: insured by Medicare, admitted to hospital for
Clinical Group-surgical orthopedic excluding spine and Clinical Episode-major joint
replacement of the lower extremity in Diagnosis Related Group-469 or 470.
This sample size gave sufficient information to carry out the tests desired. Whether it is
representative of the target population is a question for discussion (refer to Chapter Five of this
manuscript). Lewin (2016), in the CMS BPCI Models 2-4: Year 2 Evaluation and Monitoring
Annual Report, indicated that there were 81 hospitals and 17,004 episodes of LEJR in the first
year of BPCI. Annualized and extrapolated across time, this meant that the study sample
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treatment group was about two percent of the total population. The methodology used in this
study, however, was similar to the methods used by CMS and its program evaluation partners.
Therefore, it paved the way for this study and it might provide a basis for further study of this
topic with additional hospital data.
Data Sources
There were two secondary data sources used in this study. First, the hospital had robust
electronic health records that contain financial, operational and clinical data for every patient
encounter, including admissions to the hospital and outpatient visits for emergency care and
other procedures and tests. Second, as part of the agreement with CMS for participating in the
BPCI Initiative, patient-level claims data was made available to the hospital that contained
detailed readmissions and cost data, especially for the post-acute care that is not normally
available to the hospital. These data sources are described more fully in the following
paragraphs.
Hospital Data
First, a delimited file containing the study sample patient data records was produced by
the hospital’s analytics department according to the field requirements mutually agreed to and
approved by the Institutional Review Board. It was appropriately de-identified according to
healthcare industry standards. Refer to the Ethical Considerations section at the end of this
chapter for more detail on that topic. This file contained 1147 patient encounter records for 36
months, which created a fairly balanced before and after study with similar numbers of records in
each group that meet the selection criteria of LEJR episodes. Each of the records contained 16
fields of data for the patient encounters. The file is illustrated in the following Tables 3 and 4:

47

Table 3. Summary of records in hospital data file.
Before BPCI

After BPCI

January 1, 2014 – June 30, 2015

July 1, 2015 – December 31, 2016

622 Medicare LEJR Records

525 Medicare LEJR Records

Table 4. Detail of records in hospital data file.
Category

Fields

Purpose

Patient
Descriptors

⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅

Unique Encounter Number
Patient Age (range bands)
Payor Code
Femur Fracture (Y/N)
Hip or Knee (H/K)
Diagnosis Code
Pre-Operative Education (Y/N)

⋅ Connect the data sources
⋅ Descriptive
⋅ Potential demographic factors to
consider

Episode
Descriptors

⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅

Admit Date (monthly bands)
Surgeon Code
Surgical Site Infection (Y/N)
Deep Vein Thrombosis/PE (Y/N)
Discharge Disposition Code
Discharge Disposition Agency

⋅ Filter before and after data
⋅ Descriptive
⋅ Potential clinical factors to consider

Outcome
Variables

⋅ Hospital Charges ($)
⋅ Hospital Length of Stay (days)
⋅ 30-Day Readmissions (Y/N)

⋅ Dependent variables to study
hypotheses
⋅ Outcomes – financial, operational,
clinical

CMS Data
Second, a delimited file was received from CMS containing some additional data about
the patient episodes for a subset of the study sample patient data. As with the hospital file, it was
appropriately de-identified according to healthcare industry standards. This file contained 367
patient encounter records for 12 months of BPCI performance from July 1, 2015 – June 30,
2016. Note that this file did not contain any data for patient encounters prior to the start of the
BPCI program or for the latter 6 months of the study timeframe. Unfortunately, this weakened
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the study design with respect to the financial outcome, as the control group data was not
available. However, this deficiency was compensated for as explained later in this chapter.
Furthermore, the CMS file only contained treatment group data for the first 12 of the 18 months
of BPCI program participation due to a lag in CMS processing and distribution of the program
data. Since the BPCI program defines an episode to include all patient care services extending 30
days after hospital discharge, hospitals such as the study site are dependent upon CMS to provide
the additional data for the 30 days of post discharge care in order to evaluate the readmissions
and total payment information. Each of the records in the CMS file contained 12 fields of data
for the patient encounters. The file is illustrated in the following Tables 5 and 6.
Table 5. Summary of records in CMS data file.
Before BPCI

After BPCI

January 1, 2014 – June 30, 2015

July 1, 2015 – June 30, 2016

No data provided by CMS

367 Medicare LEJR Records

Table 6. Detail of records in CMS data file.
Category

Fields

Purpose

Patient
Descriptor

⋅ Unique Encounter Number

⋅ Connect the data sources

Readmissions
Data

⋅ SNF Length of Stay (days)
⋅ Descriptive
⋅ SNF Readmissions
⋅ Potential clinical factors to consider
⋅ SNF Length of Stay for Readmission

Payment
Data

⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅

Hospital Payment ($)
SNF Payment ($)
SNF Readmissions Payment ($)
Outpatient Payment ($)
Home Health Payment ($)
Medical Equipment Payment ($)
Physician Payment ($)
Total Episode Payment ($)
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⋅ Dependent variables to study one
hypothesis
⋅ Outcome – financial

Dataset Preparation Procedures
Preparing the study dataset involved several steps to combine, clean and code the data.
This is described here and illustrated below in Figure 12.
1. Combine the hospital and CMS files using the unique encounter number that was common to
both files. This operation was accomplished by importing both files into separate worksheets
in a Microsoft Excel workbook and using the VLOOKUP() function to match the encounter
numbers and combine the data. The result was a single Excel worksheet.
2. Review and clean the resulting file by removing extraneous data (some rows and columns)
that was included in the original raw files. This was accomplished by deleting columns other
than those described earlier and applying filters to ensure that the only rows that remained
met the study criteria: Medicare patients (Payor Code=M11 or M14), LEJR procedures
(DRG Code=469 or 470), and 36-month date range (Admit Date=2014-01 through 2016-12).
The result was an Excel worksheet with 1147 rows and 27 columns (16 hospital + 12 CMS –
1 duplicate encounter number).
3. Normalize the hospital charges data so that dollar amounts would be comparable across the
study timeframe. This was accomplished by applying an algorithm that increased the charges
data and compounded as appropriate for specific time ranges. This corresponded with
hospital rate increases and materials contract changes that occurred at points during the
study. The methodology was validated by hospital subject matter experts.
4. Code the data for proper analysis required by the statistical software package by adding
columns where necessary and using Excel filters, sorting, find and replace, and copy and
paste. In total, 13 new fields/columns were added. Of those, 10 were coded as numeric binary
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fields by assigning 0 and 1 values to existing data; 1 new field was added to interpret
admission dates in monthly bands; 1 new field was added to code discharge disposition text
into numeric codes; and 1 new field was added for the BPCI Target price. The final study
dataset was an Excel worksheet with 1147 rows and 40 columns and the layout is shown in
Table 7 below.

Figure 12. Illustration of study dataset preparation process.
Table 7. Final study dataset layout.
No. Field

Source

Description

1

ENCOUNTER_ID

HOSP

Unique Encounter Number (numeric)

2

AGE_CODE

HOSP

Patient Age Range Code (numeric)

3

PAYOR_CODE

HOSP

Payor Code (text)

4

FRACTURE_TXT

HOSP

Femur Fracture (text)

5

HIP_KNEE_TXT

HOSP

Hip or Knee (text)

6

MSDRG_CODE

HOSP

Diagnosis Code (numeric)

7

PREOP_ED_FLAG

HOSP

Pre-Operative Education (Y/N)

8

ADMIT_DATE

HOSP

Admit Date (date)

9

SURGEON_CODE

HOSP

Surgeon Code (numeric)

10

SSI_FLAG

HOSP

Surgical Site Infection (1/0)

11

DVTPE_FLAG

HOSP

Deep Vein Thrombosis/PE (1/0)

12

DC_DISPO_TYPE

HOSP

Discharge Disposition Type (text)

13

DC_DISPO_AGENCY

HOSP

Discharge Disposition Agency (text)
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No. Field

Source

Description

14

HOSP_CHRG

HOSP

Hospital Charges ($)

15

HOSP_LOS

HOSP

Hospital Length of Stay (days)

16

READMIT_FLAG

HOSP

30-Day Readmissions Flag (1/0)

17

HOSP_PMT

CMS

Hospital Payment ($)

18

SNF_PMT

CMS

SNF Payment ($)

19

SNF_LOS

CMS

SNF Length of Stay (days)

20

SNF_READMIT_AGNCY

CMS

SNF Readmissions Agency (text)

21

SNF_READMIT_PMT

CMS

SNF Readmissions Payment ($)

22

SNF_READMIT_LOS

CMS

SNF Length of Stay Readmissions (days)

23

OP_PMT

CMS

Outpatient Payment ($)

24

HH_PMT

CMS

Home Health Payment ($)

25

DME_PMT

CMS

Medical Equipment Payment ($)

26

PHYSICIAN_PMT

CMS

Physician Payment ($)

27

TOT_ALLOWED_PMT

CMS

Total Episode Payment ($)

28

BP_FLAG

NEW

BPCI Treatment Period Flag (1/0)

29

MC_FLAG

NEW

Medicare Patient Flag (1/0)

30

ADMIT_MONTH

NEW

Admit Date (YYYY-MM)

31

OVER65_FLAG

NEW

Patient Age Over 65 Flag (1/0)

32

KNEE_FLAG

NEW

Knee or Hip Flag (1/0)

33

DRG470_FLAG

NEW

DRG 470 or 469 Flag (1/0)

34

DCHOME_FLAG

NEW

Discharge Home Flag (1/0)

35

DCHH_FLAG

NEW

Discharge Home Health Flag (1/0)

36

DCSNF_FLAG

NEW

Discharge SNF Flag (1/0)

37

DCIRF_FLAG

NEW

Discharge Inpatient Rehab Flag (1/0)

38

DCEXP_FLAG

NEW

Discharge Expired Flag (1/0)

39

DCDISPO_CODE

NEW

Discharge Disposition Code (numeric)

40

TARGET_PMT

NEW

BPCI Target Payment ($)

Variables of Interest
Although many of the variables in the study dataset were statistically or generally
described and analyzed as potential contributors to the results, the following variables were of
particular interest in answering the research questions and evaluating the hypotheses.
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Independent Variable
The BPCI treatment flag, BP_FLAG, was used to separate the treatment group data from
the control group data. This flag was a categorical variable assigned a value of 1 if the patient
admission date was in the BPCI program 18-month date range July 1, 2015 – December 31,
2016. The flag was assigned a value of 0 if the patient admission date was in the 18-month
period before the BPCI program: January 1, 2014 – June 30, 2015. It was effectively the proxy
variable that indicated whether the BPCI treatment was applied to the patient.
Dependent Variables
The first three hypotheses considered whether financial, operational and clinical
outcomes changed after BPCI treatment and therefore required the evaluation of three dependent
variables, respectively: hospital charges, hospital length of stay, and 30-day readmissions flag.
Total episode payment and target payment were also analyzed as dependent variables, despite
missing values. These are all described below.
Hospital charges, HOSP_CHRG, a continuous variable expressed in dollars, was a
measure of the total charges submitted by the hospital for each patient. This variable did not
include post-acute care charges, which would give a more complete view of financial outcomes,
but that data was not available for the control group of patients. Furthermore, it is important to
note that hospital charges are not the same as CMS payments; CMS made payments based on
allowable amounts. However, the value of using hospital charges in this instance was in
discovering whether the hospital was able to make progress in containing its costs for BPCI
patients – one of the main goals of BPCI program. Furthermore, two recent studies showed that
hospital charges generally have a linear relationship to payments, and on average, hospital
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charges were 3.6 times the CMS reimbursement amount for major joint replacements
(Nwachukwu et al., 2015; Thakore et al., 2015).
Hospital length of stay, HOSP_LOS, a continuous variable expressed in days, was a
measure of how long a patient spent in the hospital before, during and after the LEJR surgery. It
was a CMS-accepted measure that indicated operational outcomes.
30-day readmissions flag, READMIT_FLAG, a categorical variable expressed as 1 for
yes or 0 for no, was an indication of whether the patient was readmitted to the hospital within 30
days of the LEJR surgery. It was a CMS-accepted measure that indicated clinical outcomes.
Total episode payment, TOT_ALLOWED_PMT, a continuous variable expressed in
dollars, was a measure of the bundled payment made by CMS for all patient care services
associated with the episode. This data was only available for the first 12 months of BPCI
treatment group patients. Since it could not be compared to the control group, it was instead
compared to the target payment, TARGET_PMT, a continuous variable expressed in dollars,
which was the contractual amount agreed to by the hospital. While this method of analysis did
not strictly follow the research design (compare treatment to control), it added to the body of
knowledge about financial outcomes.
Missing Values
There were no missing values for any of the hospital-provided data. The CMS file only
contained data for the first 12 months of BPCI treatment. As such, all of the control group and
the latter 6 months of the treatment group had missing values for the CMS payment data and the
SNF readmissions data. This was not unexpected and the research design compensated for this.
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Data Analysis
Various tools and techniques were selected to analyze the data depending upon the best
fit for each research question and the variables under analysis. These are described below and
summarized in Table 8.
Tools and Techniques
Three software tools were used in combination to describe the data and show the results
of the study: Microsoft Excel, Tableau Desktop Professional and IBM SPSS Statistics. All three
of these are among market leading software tools for data management, manipulation, charting
and description, statistical analysis, and data visualization.
Similarly, several different analysis techniques were selected based on the research
question and the variables available. These included 1.) descriptive statistics for mean, standard
deviation, and other summary information; 2.) trend charting over time; 3.) normality testing and
histograms for data distribution charting; 4.) homogeneity of variances testing; 5.) outlier data
analysis; and 6.) hypotheses testing for comparison of means and proportions.
Descriptive Statistics
The first phase of data analysis was to gain a general overview of the data and patterns.
This was accomplished by running descriptive statistics in Excel to discover how the average
patient demographics and outcomes compared between treatment and controls groups. If the
demographics were similar, it would lend validity to the design of comparing these two groups.
Parenthetically, this same view was also looked at for a set of non-Medicare patients to validate
its rejection from this study.
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Research Question 1 Analysis
The analysis for research question 1 was to determine if financial outcomes changed
statistically from before the bundled payment program to after. First, summary statistics were run
on the dependent variable hospital charges in SPSS to see the means for treatment and control
groups. Second, a trend chart of mean hospital charges by month was produced in Tableau with
mathematically-calculated trend lines to visualize the data, including the p-value to determine the
significance of the changes. Third, a normality test was run on the two samples (control and
treatment) to determine whether the hospital charges data was normally distributed. This was an
assumption for hypothesis testing, even though the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) applies to this
data. CLT posits that for non-normal data, the distribution of the sample means is approximately
normal, regardless of the distribution of the original data if the sample size is large enough
(typically greater than 30) and all samples have the same size. Fourth, a homogeneity test was
run to determine if equal variances existed. This was another assumption for hypothesis testing.
Fifth, a hypothesis test on the two independent samples (t-test) was run in SPSS to be able to
reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis stated that there was no statistical
change in hospital charges from before to after the BPCI program. The alternative hypothesis
stated that there was a statistical change in hospital charges between the two groups.
H1o: μt = μc

H1a: μt ≠ µc

μt = mean hospital charges for the treatment group
μc = mean hospital charges for the control group
Sixth, the non-parametric equivalent of t-test, Mann-Whitney U test, was also run because the
data was found to be not normally distributed. This was only used as a weak second check since
this test is more appropriate for ordinal data.
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Next, because the data was found to be not morally distributed with evidence of outliers,
an analysis was conducted after removing major outliers to discover if the hypothesis test results
were similar or different. Major outliers were defined as hospital charges values residing below
the median of the bottom quartile minus 3 times the interquartile range (IQR) and residing above
the median of the highest quartile plus 3 times the IQR.
The analysis described above was repeated four more times on subsets of the data to
determine if the hospital charges changed significantly for specific patient types. These were
knee replacement only patients, hip replacement only patients, patients without complications
and/or comorbidities, and patients with complications and/or comorbidities. These datasets were
filtered subsets of the full dataset based on the fields KNEE_FLAG and DRG470_FLAG.
Finally, CMS payment data for the treatment group (all that was available) was charted as
the mean payments by month with trend lines to visualize the data. This was done for individual
payments to see the variability and also total payments compared to target payments, again to
visualize the BPCI program financial outcomes.
Research Question 2 Analysis
The analysis for research question 2 was to determine if operational outcomes changed
statistically from before the bundled payment program to after. First, summary statistics were run
on the dependent variable hospital length of stay in SPSS to see the means for treatment and
control groups. Second, a trend chart of mean hospital length of stay by month was produced in
Tableau with mathematically-calculated trend lines to visualize the data, including the p-value to
determine the significance of the changes. Third, a normality test was run on the two samples
(control and treatment) to determine whether the hospital length of stay data was normally
distributed. This was an assumption for hypothesis testing, even though the Central Limit
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Theorem (CLT) applies to this data. CLT posits that for non-normal data, the distribution of the
sample means is approximately normal, regardless of the distribution of the original data if the
sample size is large enough (typically greater than 30) and all samples have the same size.
Fourth, a homogeneity test was run to determine if equal variances existed. This was another
assumption for hypothesis testing. Fifth, a hypothesis test on the two independent samples (t-test)
was run in SPSS to be able to reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis
stated that there was no statistical change in hospital length of stay from before to after the BPCI
program. The alternative hypothesis stated that there was a statistical change in hospital length of
stay between the two groups.
H2o: μt = μc

H2a: μt ≠ µc

μt = mean hospital length of stay for the treatment group
μc = mean hospital length of stay for the control group
Sixth, the non-parametric equivalent of t-test, Mann-Whitney U test, was also run because the
data was found to be not normally distributed. This was only used as a weak second check since
this test is more appropriate for ordinal data.
Next, because the data was found to be not morally distributed with evidence of outliers,
an analysis was conducted after removing major outliers to discover if the hypothesis test results
were similar or different. Major outliers were defined as hospital length of stay values residing
below the median of the bottom quartile minus 3 times the interquartile range (IQR) and residing
above the median of the highest quartile plus 3 times the IQR.
Finally, the analysis described above was repeated four more times on subsets of the data
to determine if the hospital length of stay changed significantly for specific patient types. These
were knee replacement only patients, hip replacement only patients, patients without
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complications and/or comorbidities, and patients with complications and/or comorbidities. These
datasets were filtered subsets of the full dataset based on the fields KNEE_FLAG and
DRG470_FLAG.
Research Question 3 Analysis
The analysis for research question 3 was to determine if clinical outcomes changed
statistically from before the bundled payment program to after. First, summary statistics were run
on the dependent variable 30-day readmissions flag in SPSS to see the proportions for treatment
and control groups. Second, a trend chart of mean rate of 30-day readmissions by month was
produced in Tableau with mathematically-calculated trend lines to visualize the data, including
the p-value to determine the significance of the changes. Third, a Chi-Square 2x2 contingency
table test for independence was run in SPSS to assess the relationship between the two
categorical variables to be able to reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis
stated that there was no statistical change in the proportion of 30-day readmissions from before
to after the BPCI program. The alternative hypothesis stated that there was a statistical change in
the proportion of 30-day readmissions between the two groups.
H3o: μt = μc

H3a: μt ≠ µc

μt = proportion of 30-day readmissions for the treatment group
μc = proportion of 30-day readmissions for the control group
Finally, the analysis described above was repeated four more times on subsets of the data
to determine if the proportion of 30-day readmissions changed significantly for specific patient
types. These were knee replacement only patients, hip replacement only patients, patients
without complications and/or comorbidities, and patients with complications and/or
comorbidities. These datasets were filtered subsets of the full dataset based on the fields
KNEE_FLAG and DRG470_FLAG.
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Research Question 4 Analysis
The analysis for research question 4 was to determine if there were factors or
characteristics that shaped the hospital’s participation in the BPCI program. This entailed a
qualitative analysis of the hospital BPCI program design documents to attempt to determine what
changes were implemented such as care protocols, patient education, clinical team training, care
coordination among providers, follow-up care, and data analytics. The features and factors were
then illustrated in a model.
Table 8. Summary of data analysis to answer research questions.
Research Question

Variables
(Independent and Dependent)

Analysis

RQ1 (financial): What is the
relationship between a hospital’s
participation in a Medicare
bundled payment initiative and
the cost of care for LEJR
patients?

IV: BPCI Treatment
DV: Hospital Charges
DV: Total Episode Payment
DV: Target Payment

⋅ Descriptive - Mean
⋅ Normality Test:
Shapiro-Wilk
⋅ Trend Chart with p-value
⋅ Hypothesis Test: t-test
and Mann-Whitney U

RQ2 (operational): What is the IV: BPCI Treatment
relationship between a hospital’s DV: Hospital Length of Stay
participation in a Medicare
bundled payment initiative and
the utilization of hospital
services (length of stay) for
LEJR patients?

⋅ Descriptive - Mean
⋅ Normality Test:
Shapiro-Wilk
⋅ Trend Chart with p-value
⋅ Hypothesis Test: t-test
and Mann-Whitney U

RQ3 (clinical): What is the
IV: BPCI Treatment
relationship between a hospital’s DV: 30-day Readmissions Flag
participation in a Medicare
bundled payment initiative and
quality of care (readmissions) or
LEJR patients?

⋅ Descriptive – mean
⋅ Hypothesis Test:
Chi-Square 2x2
Contingency
⋅ Trend Chart with p-value

RQ4 (descriptive): What factors All variables and program
or characteristics shape a
design elements
hospital’s participation in a
Medicare bundled payment
initiative or LEJR patients?

⋅ Qualitative Review
⋅ Illustrative Modeling
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Legal and Ethical Considerations
The data files contained Protected Health Information (PHI), which broadly includes any
part of a patient's medical record or payment history, and is subject to the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) Privacy Rule. With guidance and methods
from the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services web site (http://www.hhs.gov), this data
was de-identified in accordance with the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s de-identification standard to
protect the privacy of the study participants. As is the policy at the hospital and the University of
South Florida (USF), a proposal for this research was presented to both entities’ Institutional
Review Board (IRB) for consideration and/or approval prior to accessing the datasets or
commencing the study analysis. The USF IRB determined that this study did not meet the
definition of human subjects research. The hospital IRB approved the study under its human
subjects research exemption. Therefore, the study was not under the purview of either IRB and
further approval was not required. The official letters from the IRBs are included in Appendix E
and Appendix F.
Summary
The research design and methodology described in this chapter were selected and tailored
for this study with the expectation that the research questions would be answered. The
quantitative results would lead to rejecting or failing to reject the three outcome-focused null
hypotheses, and there would also be some degree of explanation about the factors impacting the
results. Finally the qualitative aspect of this study was expected to yield a descriptive model of
the BPCI implementation at the study hospital.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
RESULTS

Introduction
This chapter describes the results of the data analysis and the findings of the study. It
begins with a summary of descriptive results of the hospital’s BPCI program characteristics and
the data sample studied. Next, it gives a summary statement of the results of the data analysis,
followed by a detailed presentation of the data analysis and results organized by research
question. It concludes with a brief summation of the results that lead into the discussion in
Chapter Five.
Summary of Descriptive Results
Description of Hospital BPCI Program
The BPCI program characteristics elected by the study hospital are outlined in the Table
9 below. This information was extracted from the agreement with CMS and it was important to
the context of the results and findings. In particular, the post discharge period was selected to be
30 days rather than the longer 60-day and 90-day options, which would significantly impact total
costs, target prices, and risks and incentives. It is also worthy to note that the physician
gainsharing was contingent upon meeting or exceeding four quality goals: 30-day readmissions
rate of 6%, surgical site infection rate of 3%, deep vein thrombosis/pulmonary embolism rate of
0.4%, and pre-operative education rate of 75%. As such, the results of these measures were also
studied and reported below, in addition to the three main study variables.
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Table 9. BPCI characteristics for the study hospital.
BPCI Characteristic
Dates of Participation
Dates of this Study

Hospital Election
⋅ 3 Year commitment with CMS:
⋅ July 1, 2015 – June 30, 2018
⋅ First 18 months of program:
⋅ July 1, 2015 - December 31, 2016

BPCI Model

⋅ Model 2 for Clinical Episode LEJR
⋅ DRG 469 and DRG 470

Post-Discharge Period
Target Price Discount

⋅ 30 days after hospital discharge
⋅ 3% discount from historical total cost of care (FY2010-2012)
⋅ With wage index, case mix, volume adjustments

Incentives and Risks

⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅

Gainsharing with physicians
From internal cost savings and CMS payments
Capped at 50% of Medicare Payments
Hospital bears 100% risk to threshold
No patient incentives elected

Quality Measures and
Targets

⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅

30-day Readmissions Rate (6%)
Surgical Site Infection Rate (3%)
Deep Vein Thrombosis/Pulmonary Embolism Rate (0.4%)
Pre-Operative Education Rate (75%)
ED use within 30 days
All-cause 30-day mortality rate
Care Pathways Redesign
Patient Activation, Education, Risk Management
Care Coordination
Organizational Structure
Technology and Data Analytics
Skilled Nursing Facility 3-day hospital stay waiver
Post discharge home visit waiver
Telehealth waiver

Program Design

Medicare Payment Waivers

Description of Dataset Sample Studied
As discussed briefly in the Method chapter, an early decision to exclude non-Medicare
patients from the dataset was made for several reasons. Two of those reasons were revealed
quantitatively by the descriptive information generated from the data. Table 10 below illustrates
that the patient profile was significantly different between Medicare and non-Medicare patients,
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in terms of volume (1147 vs. 1806), age (75.4 vs. 65.6), proportion of hip surgeries (47.0% vs.
40.3%), and proportion of complications (6.1% vs. 3.0%). Furthermore, pre-operative education,
a BPCI-specific program, was implemented for both cohorts, despite one cohort not being
enrolled. This means the BPCI treatment spilled into the non-Medicare group. These facts
supported excluding non-Medicare patients from all further data analysis.
Table 10. Comparison of Medicare LEJR patients to non-Medicare during study period.
Description

Medicare
LEJR Patients

Non-Medicare
LEJR Patients

Number of patients total

1147

38.8%

1806

61.2%

Average age of patients

75.4

---

65.6

---

LEJR Procedure Hip (vs Knee)

539

47.0%

728

40.3%

70

6.1%

55

3.0%

374

71.2%

678

74.8%

Complications DRG 469 (vs 470)
Received pre-operative education after BPCI program

The final study dataset contained a control group of 622 Medicare patients before the
BPCI program was implemented, and a treatment group of 525 Medicare patients enrolled in the
BPCI program. The patient profiles of these two groups were similar in terms of age (75.5 vs.
75.3), proportion of hip surgeries (47.1% vs. 46.9%) and proportion of complications (5.8% vs.
6.5%). The supporting descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix G. Refer to Table 11 for a
summary overview of the final dataset.
Table 11. Overview of study dataset patient characteristics.
Description

Control Group
Before BPCI

Treatment Group
After BPCI

Total

Number of patients in dataset

622

54.2%

525

45.8%

1147

100%

Average age of patients

75.5

---

75.3

---

75.4

---

LEJR Procedure Hip (vs Knee)

293

47.1%

246

46.9%

539

47.0%

36

5.8%

34

6.5%

70

6.1%

Complications DRG 469 (vs 470)
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Summary Study Results
Main Study Results
The overall findings for research questions 1, 2, and 3 are shown in Table 12 below. In
summary, the mean hospital charges increased from before BPCI to after BPCI however it was
not statistically significant as indicated by the p-value (p =0.345). The mean hospital length of
stay decreased from before BPCI to after BPCI and it was statistically significant as indicated by
the p-value (p=0.002). The 30-day readmissions proportion increase from before BPCI to after
BPCI was not statistically significant as indicated by the high p-value (p=0.925). This data is
presented and explained in detail in the following sections. Refer to Appendices G, H, I and J for
supporting statistics.
Table 12. Overall findings for research questions 1, 2, and 3.
Description

RQ1: Hospital charges
($)

RQ2: Hospital length of stay
(days)

Control Group
Before BPCI
Mean StdDev

Mean StdDev

$72,453 $19,960

$73,571 $20,038

Mean StdDev

Mean StdDev

3.98
Proportion

RQ3: 30-day readmissions
(proportion)

Treatment Group
After BPCI

0.080

1.80

3.64

1.94

Percent Proportion

Percent

8.0%

0.082

8.2%

Statistically
Significant
Differences
Y/N

P-value

N

0.345
(t-test)

Y/N

P-value

Y

0.002
(t-test)

Y/N

P-value

N

0.925
(chi-sq)

Additional Results Related to Main Study
Research questions 1, 2, and 3 were also studied in parsed subsets of data and those
finding are shown in Table 13 below. In summary, the mean hospital charges did not statistically
change from before BPCI to after BPCI for knee and hip procedures when analyzed separately,
65

and when DRG 470 (without complications and/or comorbidities) and DRG 469 (with
complications and/or comorbidities) procedures were analyzed separately. The mean hospital
length of stay did statistically change from before BPCI to after BPCI for knee procedures, but
not hip procedures. Similarly, the mean hospital length of stay did statistically change for DRG
470 procedures, but not for DRG 469 procedures. The 30-day readmissions proportion did not
statistically change from before BPCI to after BPCI for any of the subsets of patients: knee and
hip procedures, and DRG 470 and DRG 469 procedures. Refer to Appendices H, I and J for
supporting statistics.
Table 13. Additional findings for research questions 1, 2, and 3.
Knee Procedures
Only

Hip Procedures
Only

DRG 470 without
Complications

DRG 469 with
Complications

TOP: P-values from relevant statistical tests (t-test, chi-sq)
BOTTOM: Statistically Significant Difference Before/After BPCI (Y/N)

RQ1: Hospital
Charges

0.114
N

0.931
N

0.471
N

0.682
N

RQ2: Hospital
Length of Stay

0.002
Y

0.066
N

0.000
Y

0.740
N

RQ3: 30-day
Readmissions

0.389
N

0.548
N

0.697
N

0.327
N

Other Results
The overall findings for the additional quality variables and discharge patterns are shown
in Tables 14 and 15 below. In summary, the rate of surgical site infections decreased from before
BPCI to after BPCI and it was statistically significant as indicated by the p-value (p=0.024). The
rate of deep vein thrombosis/pulmonary embolism did not statistically change (p=0.360). Preoperative education was only implemented as part of BPCI so the change from before to after
was statistically significant (p<0.0001). There were also statistically significant changes in the
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patient discharge patterns from before to after BPCI. Specifically, discharges to skilled nursing
facilities and other care facilities decreased as shown by the low p-values. This data is presented
in detail in the following sections. Refer to Appendix G for supporting summary statistics and
Appendix K for supporting comparison statistics.
Table 14. Overall findings for additional quality variables and discharge patterns.
Description

Other Factors

Control Group
Before BPCI
Proportion

Treatment Group
After BPCI

Percent Proportion

Percent

Statistically
Significant
Differences
Y/N

P-value
(chi-sq)

Surgical Site Infections

0.0096

0.96%

0

0

Y

0.024

Deep Vein Thrombosis

0.0080

0.80%

0.0038

0.38%

N

0.360

0

0

0.7124 71.24%

Y

0.000

Pre-Operative Education

Table 15. Overall findings for discharge patterns.
Description

Discharge Patterns

Control Group
Before BPCI
Proportion

Treatment Group
After BPCI

Percent Proportion

5.79%

Percent

Y/N

8.38%

N

0.086

P-value
(chi-sq)

Home

0.0579

Home Health (HH)

0.3698 36.98%

0.4114 41.14%

N

0.149

Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF)

0.5386 53.86%

0.4781 47.81%

Y

0.041

Inpatient Rehabilitation (IRF)

0.0161

1.61%

0.0229

2.29%

N

0.404

Expired

0.0048

0.48%

0.0038

0.38%

N

0.795

Other Care

0.0129

1.29%

0

0

Y

0.009
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0.0838

Statistically
Significant
Differences

Detailed Study Results
Research Question 1 Results
The analysis for research question 1 was to determine if financial outcomes changed
statistically from before the bundled payment program to after. All of the supporting statistics
related to this research question are in Appendix H.
Trend Graph. The mean hospital charges (normalized to account for time-based changes
in rates and materials) for each month over the 36-month study timeframe is illustrated in Figure
13 below. This shows an increasing pattern both before and after BPCI as indicated by the
mathematical trend lines. The trend line equation and model are found in Appendix H and a pvalue of 0.0707 indicates that this upward trend is not statistically significant.

Figure 13. Trend of mean hospital charges before and after BPCI.
Normality Test. The hospital charges data both before and after BPCI were found to be
not normal as illustrated in the normality test results, histograms and plots shown in Appendix H.
Since both sample sizes were less than 2,000, the Shapiro-Wilk test statistic was used. Both p68

values were very small (p<0.0001) indicating that the null hypotheses that the data was normal
must be rejected. Therefore the data in both the control and treatments groups were not normal
distributions.
Homogeneity of Variance Test. The hospital charges data both before and after BPCI
were found to have statistically equal variances throughout the dataset as illustrated in the
homogeneity of variance test results shown in Appendix H. The Levene test statistic was used to
measure the variances, and the p-value was high (p=0.286), indicating that the null hypotheses
which states the variances were equal is not rejected.
Hypothesis Tests. The mean hospital charges increased from $72,453 in the period before
BPCI to $73,571 in the period after BPCI. Since the objective was to determine whether the
means were significantly different between two independent samples, a t-test was conducted. At
a confidence level of 95% and α = 0.05, the p value was found to be 0.345, indicating that the
increase in hospital charges was not statistically significant. Since the hospital charges data was
found to be not normally distributed, however, a second hypothesis test was conducted to
validate the findings. The non-parametric test statistic Mann-Whitney U (although a weak
validation because the data is not ordinal) produced supporting results (p=0.351) that the change
is not significant. Therefore there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis at the 5%
significance level as shown in Table 16.
Table 16. Summary of hypothesis 1 results.
Hypothesis

Result

H1o: μt = μc

FAIL TO REJECT

H1a: μt ≠ µc
μt = mean hospital charges before BPCI
μc = mean hospital charges after BPCI
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Outlier Analysis and Results. The normality test conducted revealed that the hospital
charges data was not normally distributed. This is also evident by the right-skewed tails in the
histograms (see Appendix H). The major outliers were verified as valid data and not
measurement errors or experimental design flaws. However, as a secondary test of the
hypothesis, 16 data points were excluded based on the formula using 3 times the interquartile
range described in the methods chapter. The results were the same as those from the complete
dataset. The outlier-trimmed data was still not normally distributed, the variances were
homogeneous, and the hypothesis testing resulted in failure to reject the null hypothesis.
Data Analysis for Knee and Hip Separated. The same set of tests were conducted to
measure the change in hospital charges for knee-only procedures and again for hip-only
procedures. All of these four data groups (knee before and after BPCI, and hip before and after
BPCI) were found to be not normally distributed, however there was homogeneity of variances
for both knee and hip data. T-tests for both datasets (knee: p=0.114 and hip: p=0.931) indicated
that hospital charges did not significantly change from before to after BPCI. The non-parametric
Mann-Whitney U tests also support those findings that the there is insufficient evidence to reject
the null hypotheses: there was no significant change in hospital charges for knee-only patients or
for hip-only patients.
Data Analysis for DRG 470 and DRG 469 Separated. The same set of tests were
conducted to measure the change in hospital charges for DRG 470-only procedures (without
complications and/or comorbidities) and again for DRG 469-only procedures (without
complications and/or comorbidities). All of these four data groups (DRG 470 before and after
BPCI, and DRG 469 before and after BPCI) were found to be not normally distributed, however
there was homogeneity of variances for both knee and hip data. T-tests for both datasets (DRG
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470: p=0.471 and DRG 469: p=0.682) indicated that hospital charges did not significantly
change from before to after BPCI. The non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests also support those
findings that there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypotheses: there was no significant
change in hospital charges for patients with or without complications and/or comorbidities.
CMS Payment Trends. The seven types of CMS allowed payments that make up the
BPCI bundled for the treatment group (all that was available) was graphed over the first 12
months as illustrated in Figure 14 below. This visualization of the data shows a fairly stable
payment trend for hospital, physician, durable medical equipment, outpatient, and SNF
readmissions. It shows a trend upward for home health and a downward trend for skilled nursing
facilities, although the latter had high variability. Figure 15 below shows that both the total CMS
actual payments and the BPCI target payments trended downward across the first 12 months of
the BPCI treatment period, however, the gap between them remains, with the target amount
lower than the actual payments. Both have noticeable variability.

Figure 14. Trends of CMS monthly average payments for BPCI patients.
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Figure 15. Trend of CMS total monthly average payments for BPCI patients.
Research Question 2 Results
The analysis for research question 2 was to determine if operational outcomes changed
statistically from before the bundled payment program to after. All of the supporting statistics
related to this research question are in Appendix I.
Trend Graph. The mean hospital length of stay for each month over the 36-month study
timeframe is illustrated in Figure 16 below. This shows a decreasing pattern both before and after
BPCI as indicated by the mathematical trend lines. The trend line equation and model are found
in Appendix I and a p-value of 0.0058 supports this trend as significant.
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Figure 16. Trend of mean hospital length of stay before and after BPCI.
Normality Test. The hospital length of stay data both before and after BPCI were found
to be not normal as illustrated in the normality test results, histograms and plots shown in
Appendix I. Since both sample sizes were less than 2,000, the Shapiro-Wilk test statistic was
used. Both p-values were very small (p<0.0001) indicating that the null hypotheses that the data
was normal must be rejected. Therefore the data in both the control and treatments groups were
not normal distributions.
Homogeneity of Variance Test. The hospital length of stay data both before and after
BPCI were found to have statistically equal variances throughout the dataset as illustrated in the
homogeneity of variance test results shown in Appendix I. The Levene test statistic was used to
measure the variances, and the p-value was high (p=0.204), indicating that the null hypotheses
which states the variances were equal is not rejected.
Hypothesis Tests. The mean hospital length of stay decreased from 3.98 days in the
period before BPCI to 3.64 days in the period after BPCI. Since the objective was to determine
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whether the means were significantly different between two independent samples, a t-test was
conducted. At a confidence level of 95% and α = 0.05, the p value was found to be 0.002,
indicating that the decrease in hospital length of stay was statistically significant. Since the
hospital length of stay data was found to be not normally distributed, however, a second
hypothesis test was conducted to validate the findings. The non-parametric test statistic MannWhitney U (although a weak validation because the data is not ordinal) produced supporting
results (p<0.0001) that the change was significant. Therefore there is sufficient evidence to reject
the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level as shown in Table 17.
Table 17. Summary of hypothesis 2 results.
Hypothesis

Result

H2o: μt = μc

REJECT

H2a: μt ≠ µc
μt = mean hospital length of stay before BPCI
μc = mean hospital length of stay after BPCI

Outlier Analysis and Results. The normality test conducted revealed that the hospital
length of stay data was not normally distributed. This is also evident by the right-skewed tails in
the histograms (see Appendix H). The major outliers were verified as valid data and not
measurement errors or experimental design flaws. However, as a secondary test of the
hypothesis, 79 data points were excluded based on the formula using 3 times the interquartile
range described in the methods chapter. The results were the same as those from the complete
dataset. The outlier-trimmed data was still not normally distributed, the variances were
homogeneous, and the hypothesis testing resulted in sufficient evidence to reject the null
hypothesis.
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Data Analysis for Knee and Hip Separated. The same set of tests were conducted to
measure the change in hospital length of stay for knee-only procedures and again for hip-only
procedures. All of these four data groups (knee before and after BPCI, and hip before and after
BPCI) were found to be not normally distributed, however there was homogeneity of variances
for both knee and hip data. T-tests for both datasets (knee: p=0.002 and hip: p=0.066) indicated
that hospital length of stay did significantly change from before to after BPCI for knee patients
but not for hip patients. The non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests also support those disparate
findings: there was significant change observed in hospital length of stay for knee-only patients
but not for hip-only patients.
Data Analysis for DRG 470 and DRG 469 Separated. The same set of tests were
conducted to measure the change in hospital length of stay for DRG 470-only procedures
(without complications and/or comorbidities) and again for DRG 469-only procedures (without
complications and/or comorbidities). All of these four data groups (DRG 470 before and after
BPCI, and DRG 469 before and after BPCI) were found to be not normally distributed, however
there was homogeneity of variances for both knee and hip data. T-tests for both datasets (DRG
470: p<0.0001 and DRG 469: p=0.740) indicated that hospital length of stay did significantly
change from before to after BPCI for the DRG 470 patients but not for the DRG 469 patients.
The non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests also support those disparate findings: there was
significant change observed in hospital length of stay for patients without complications and/or
comorbidities but not for patients with complications and/or comorbidities.
Research Question 3 Results
The analysis for research question 3 was to determine if clinical outcomes changed
statistically from before the bundled payment program to after. This was to be achieved by
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comparing the proportion of 30-day readmissions between the control group and treatment
group. All of the supporting statistics related to this research question are in Appendix J.
Trend Graph. The rate of 30-day readmissions for each month over the 36-month study
timeframe is illustrated in Figure 17 below. This shows an erratic pattern both before and after
BPCI and a slight overall downward trend as indicated by the mathematical trend lines. The
trend line equation and model are found in Appendix J and a p-value of 0.6065 indicates that this
is not a statistically significant trend.

Figure 17. Trend of rate of 30-day readmissions before and after BPCI.
Hypothesis Test. The proportion of 30-day readmissions slightly increased from 0.080
(8.0%) in the period before BPCI to 0.082 (8.2%) in the period after BPCI. Since there were two
independent samples but both variables were categorical, the Chi-Square test applied to a 2×2
contingency table was used. At a confidence level of 95% and α = 0.05, the p-value was found to
be 0.925, indicating that the increase in 30-day readmissions proportion was not statistically
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significant. Therefore there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis at the 5%
significance level as shown in Table 18.
Table 18. Summary of hypothesis 3 results.
Hypothesis

Result

H3o: μt = μc

FAIL TO REJECT

H3a: μt ≠ µc
μt = proportion of 30-day readmissions before BPCI
μc = proportion of 30-day readmissions after BPCI
Data Analysis for Knee and Hip Separated. The same test was conducted to measure the
change in proportion of 30-day readmissions for knee-only procedures and again for hip-only
procedures. The Chi Square tests for both datasets (knee: p=0.389 and hip: p=0.548) indicated
that proportion of 30-day readmissions did not significantly change from before to after BPCI for
knee-only patients or for hip-only patients.
Data Analysis for DRG 470 and DRG 469 Separated. The same test was conducted to
measure the change in proportion of 30-day readmissions for DRG 470-only procedures (without
complications and/or comorbidities) and again for DRG 469-only procedures (without
complications and/or comorbidities). The Chi Square tests for both datasets (DRG 470: p=0.697
and DRG 469: p=0.327) indicated that proportion of 30-day readmissions did not significantly
change from before to after BPCI for patients with or without complications and/or
comorbidities.
Research Question 4 Results
The analysis for research question 4 was to determine if there were factors or
characteristics that shaped the hospital’s participation in the BPCI program. A qualitative
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analysis of the hospital BPCI program design documents showed that numerous changes were
implemented and these are summarized in the following Figure 18 below.

Figure 18. Illustration of hospital BPCI implementation model.
Six process steps were undertaken to prepare for, implement, and operationalize the BPCI
program. These were 1.) establish a leadership structure for accountability, alignment, design and
oversight; 2.) design the program methods, processes, and supporting information systems; 3.)
architect the analytics tools and processes; 4.) redesign the care pathways, patient engagement
processes, education plans, and care delivery and coordination; 5.) develop partnerships and
create alignment in objectives with providers across the continuum of care; and 6.) ensure that
the program met CMS reporting and notification compliance.
The care process redesign step was especially substantial and included redesigning care
pathways using evidenced-based protocols and patient stratification tools from pre-surgery
through the post-acute phase, enhancing care delivery with rounding and transition coaches, and
care coordination using case managers and patient navigators. Finally, education and
communication programs were developed encompassing all stakeholders from the clinical care
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team, physicians and surgeons, support staff, and other care providers to the patients and
families. Each of these steps was substantial on its own and involved many resources and time.
The intent was to have the program fully designed before the launch, however, the process
proved to be fluid and required continuous improvement on the march toward successful
financial, operational and clinical outcomes.
Other Results
The analysis on several other variables was to determine if additional quality outcomes
and discharge patterns changed statistically from before the bundled payment program to after.
All of the supporting statistics related to the analysis of the other variables are in Appendix K.
Surgical Site Infections. The rate of surgical site infections for each month over the 36month study timeframe is illustrated in Figure 19 below. This shows an erratic pattern before
BPCI and a flat zero line after BPCI. There was an overall downward trend as indicated by the
mathematical trend lines. The trend line equation and model had a p-value of 0.0479 which
indicates that this is a statistically significant trend. This was validated with the Chi-Square test
statistic. At a confidence level of 95% and α = 0.05, the p-value was found to be 0.024,
indicating that the decrease in the proportion of surgical site infections from 0.96% before BPCI
to 0% after BPCI was statistically significant.
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Figure 19. Trend of rate of surgical site infections before and after BPCI.
Deep Vein Thrombosis/Pulmonary Embolism. The rate of deep vein
thrombosis/pulmonary embolism for each month over the 36-month study timeframe is
illustrated in Figure 20 below. This shows an erratic pattern both before and after BPCI. The
mathematical trend lines are slightly downward, however, the trend line equation and model had
a p-value of 0.7330 which indicates that this is not a statistically significant trend. This was
validated with the Chi-Square test statistic. At a confidence level of 95% and α = 0.05, the pvalue was found to be 0.360, indicating that the decrease in the proportion of deep vein
thrombosis/pulmonary embolism from 0.80% before BPCI to 0.38% after BPCI was not
statistically significant.
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Figure 20. Trend of rate of deep vein thrombosis/pulmonary embolism before and after BPCI.
Pre-Operative Education. The rate of pre-operative education for each month over the 36month study timeframe is illustrated in Figure 21 below. This shows that no pre-operative
education was given before BPCI, which was expected because it was a new and key feature of
the BPCI treatment. This is followed by a sharp increase and then some variation after BPCI.
The overall trend was upward as indicated by the mathematical trend lines. The trend line
equation and model had a p-value of 0.0345 which indicates that this is a statistically significant
trend. This was validated with the Chi-Square test statistic. At a confidence level of 95% and α =
0.05, the p-value was found to be <0.0001, indicating that the increase in the proportion of preoperative education from 0% before BPCI to 71.2% after BPCI was statistically significant.
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Figure 21. Trend of rate of pre-operative education before and after BPCI.
Discharge Patterns. The discharge patterns before and after BPCI are compared and
illustrated in Figure 22 below. This shows discharges to home increased from 5.8% to 8.4%,
discharges to home health increased from 37.0% to 41.1%, discharges to skilled nursing facilities
decreased from 53.9% to 47.8%, and other types of discharges decreased from 3% to 2%.
However, Chi-Square test statistics showed that at a confidence level of 95% and α = 0.05, only
the changes in the skilled nursing facility discharges and other discharges were statistically
significant with p-values 0.041 and 0.009, respectively. The latter category (Other) included
discharges to short-term and intermediate-term care facilities, inpatient rehabilitation centers, and
patients who expired during the episode timeframe.
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Figure 22. Discharge patterns before and after BPCI.
Summary
This chapter presented summary and detailed results from the BPCI study experiment
timeframe as experienced by the hospital. Financial outcomes were not statistically significant,
despite increasing during the study. Operational outcomes were statistically significant and
showed a decrease in length of stay. The clinical outcome, 30-day readmissions, did not
statistically change even though the raw numbers indicate a slight increase. These and the other
notable observations presented in this chapter are discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Introduction
This final chapter presents a discussion of the findings of this study and their meaning
and significance. It begins with an overview of the research problem, the purpose of the study,
the research questions, and how the study was designed and carried out. Next, the results are
summarized briefly, followed by a more in-depth discussion and interpretation of the findings. It
also discusses practical implications, study limitations, and potential future research. The chapter
ends with some concluding remarks.
Research Study Overview
Healthcare costs per capita in the U.S. are higher than any other industrialized nation and
they continue to climb. By 2025, these expenditures could reach over $5 trillion annually which
is nearly one-fifth of the economy (CMS, 2016b). Furthermore coordinated, safe and high quality
care is not afforded with consistency or to all Americans. Both of these problems are on soaring
trajectories as the population ages and the demand for health services increases. The U.S.
government currently bears more than 45 percent of the national healthcare costs and that share
is also on an escalating path so it is motivated to swiftly address these problems. The Affordable
Care Act of 2010 included a provision for CMS to develop innovative ways to reduce the costs
of the healthcare industry while also improving the quality of care delivery. One of those ideas
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was the Medicare BPCI Initiative – a reimbursement model launched as an experiment in 2013
that paid hospitals a target amount for an entire episode of care, rather than piecemeal.
This research study sought to determine the efficacy of BPCI as implemented at a large
community hospital in the southeastern part of the United States in 2015 and 2016. That was to
be accomplished by measuring whether certain financial, operational and clinical outcomes
improved as result of the BPCI participation. The study design was a retrospective analysis of
clinical and financial data for joint replacement patients enrolled in BPCI as compared to a
similar patient population before the program started.
Summary of Results
Three quantitative research questions, framed as hypotheses, were addressed as well as
one qualitative research question. The first research question was whether the hospital’s
participation in BPCI led to better financial outcomes. The study hypothesized that the hospital
charges for the episode of care would be lower for BPCI patients. The data analysis indicated no
statistically significant change in hospital charges, despite the data showing a slight increase.
Also noteworthy was that the CMS allowed payments and the target payments both trended
downward during the study, however, the target was consistently lower than the allowed (actual),
indicating that the hospital was unable to achieve the financial outcome goals planned with CMS
during the study period of time. These same results (no significant change in financial outcomes)
were observed when looking only at knee replacement patients, hip replacement patients, and
patients with and without complications and comorbidities.
The second research question was whether the hospital’s participation in BPCI led to
better operational outcomes. The study hypothesized that the hospital length of stay would be
shorter for BPCI patients. The data supported this. It indicated a statistically significant decrease
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in hospital length of stay from 3.98 days to 3.64 days (8.5%). These same results (a significant
change in operational outcomes) were observed when looking only at knee replacement patients
and patients without complications and comorbidities. However, there was no significant change
for hip replacement patients, and patients with complications and comorbidities.
The third research question was whether the hospital’s participation in BPCI led to better
clinical outcomes. The study hypothesized that the 30-day readmissions would be lower for
BPCI patients. The data indicated a slight increase of less than 0.2% however, this was
statistically not significant. These same results (no significant change in clinical outcomes) were
observed when looking only at knee replacement patients, hip replacement patients, and patients
with and without complications and comorbidities.
The fourth research question was whether there were factors or characteristics that shaped
the hospital’s participation in the BPCI program. The study hypothesized that a set of factors
would define the program and lead to success. The analysis showed that there were six process
steps undertaken to prepare for, implement, and operationalize the BPCI program, however they
led to mixed results. These were leadership, program design, analytics design, care redesign,
provider partnerships, and program compliance.
There were several other findings in the data analysis. The rate of surgical site infections
statistically decreased for BPCI patients from slightly less than 1% to zero. The rate of deep vein
thrombosis/pulmonary embolism did not statistically change. The rate of pre-operative education
was statistically significant as it went from zero to 71% of patients. Discharge patterns also
showed some statistically significant changes with skilled nursing facilities receiving less postacute patients (54% before to 48% after BPCI).

86

Interpretation of the Findings
Research Question 1
The financial outcome results were not statistically significant, however the data showed
a slight increase. One of the most important drivers of the BPCI program was to control
healthcare costs through intentional care delivery redesign. Even though the data variable
studied, hospital charges, does not fully reflect the overall episode costs, it was used as a proxy
to determine the hospital’s readiness and capacity to contain, if not reduce, the cost of care for a
targeted population of patients during a defined experiment. The expectation was that because
this was a voluntary project with focused attention by leadership and the teams, that costs could
be controlled, at least in the context of the experiment. Considerable educational efforts, program
design, leadership oversight, and near real-time data analytics were established, however,
reducing hospital charges still proved to be challenging.
This may be indicative of a number of complicating factors coming together that are
more fully discussed later in this chapter. Some of these include the short amount of time allotted
to design and implement program changes before starting the experiment, the brief program
duration of this study, and not having the time to complete the education program for all of the
stakeholders prior to launch. Furthermore, there may have been other influential factors such as
personnel changes that caused breaks in the program continuity, not enough focus on internal
cost control of surgery supplies and implantables, and patient complexity and case mix. The
latter was supported by the regression analysis performed that showed significant variation in
hospital charges based on patient characteristics (age and complications) and also by surgeon. It
suggests further study to determine if certain surgeons had a more complex patient case mix or if
there is simply more opportunity to control costs.

87

Research Question 2
The operational outcome results were statistically significant, and in the expected and
desired direction. In addition, this result was also economically significant to the hospital
financial operations. A reduction of hospital length of stay of 0.34 days across the brief 18month study with a small percentage of patients to measure was a welcome result, as every
improvement in this metric generally translates to substantial hospital savings. While reducing
hospital length of stay was an intentional objective of the BPCI program and part of the
educational program for clinicians and patients, it is worthy to note that there were prior and
ongoing efforts in the healthcare industry and in the study hospital to reduce length of stay. For a
number of years, this hospital has been focused on this as an organization-wide goal and had
been making steady progress – reducing from a patient population average of over 5 days to a
mid to high 4-day range. That said, the BPCI patient group ended this study with an average of
3.68 days, down from 3.98 days – a remarkable improvement in any case.
Some studies found in the literature and presented in Chapter Two suggest that reducing
length of stay might be offset by increasing readmissions. Although this study did not find a
statistical change in readmissions, the trend was on a slight increase for the duration of the study,
notwithstanding a short 18 months. It would be a pattern to watch very closely. One other
interesting notion is that the shorter length of stay could have been influenced by the fact that the
program was designed with considerably more follow-up care protocols and proactive postdischarge case management. Perhaps that gave physicians and patients greater comfort to
discharge sooner, knowing that any complications would likely be detected quickly in the postacute setting.
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Research Question 3
The clinical outcome results were not statistically different from before the BPCI
program. While the expectation was to decrease 30-day readmissions through education, followup care protocols and aligning goals with post-acute care providers, this study found the rate to
be statistically flat. In addition to driving down healthcare costs, another important BPCI
program objective was to improve clinical quality of care. CMS uses a variety of measures to
assess this, however this study examined 30-day readmissions to the hospital. Other measures
include visits to the emergency department, mortality rates, and hospital-acquired infection rates.
Readmissions rates, as indicated in some studies found in the literature, have a close
relationship to patient demographics, case complexity (such as broken bones in the case of
orthopedic procedures), prior complications and comorbidities, provider risk tolerances for
treating conditions outside the hospital setting, and post-acute care facilities practice patterns and
alignment with hospital and physician goals and objectives. It would be worthwhile to study
some of these additional variables together with readmissions rates to see the full picture. Also,
given that there were many post-acute care facilities working with the hospital during this study,
it is conceivable that there was not enough time before and during the study timeframe to fully
educate and align these providers with the hospital BPCI objectives or develop motivational
incentives for them.
Research Question 4
The BPCI program was built on the principle that care delivery must be redesigned in
order to effect the changes desired in financial, operational and clinical outcomes. While no
template or method existed to achieve that, the study hospital took the task of designing the
program seriously and started months before the launch. The quantitative results of the first 18
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months were mixed and even somewhat discouraging. It is important to look carefully at the
program design elements to discover how they contributed to the results – both expected and
unexpected.
The hospital’s program status reports indicated that review, redesign and improvement
efforts were and are continuous and ongoing. They also highlighted that this program had
executive leadership firmly established with the BPCI vision communicated, as well as a multidisciplinary team of leaders and staff who built, implemented and oversaw the program. This
first step was noted as a critical success factor in numerous published articles about BPCI. The
second and third steps undertaken to design the program methods, processes, and supporting
information systems, and to architect the analytics tools and processes also appeared to be robust
and functioning well.
The real challenges were in the care redesign interventions and the provider partnerships.
These steps were large in scope and complexity. They took time and staff, and presented steep
learning curves for a hospital without any prior experience in this type of program or payment
system. Something as simple-sounding as educating staff and physicians on how the BPCI
worked was daunting when considering the time it takes away from the already busy hospital
operations, the turnover in personnel, and human nature to resist change. Effectively educating
patients was also a struggle with the older population (Medicare patients are mostly 65 and
older). Social norms and beliefs about an individual’s role in the management of their own health
and care, as well as poor health literacy, add to the difficulty in persuading patients to adopt a
new collaborative and engaged mindset.
Finally, developing partnerships and creating alignment in objectives with providers
across the continuum of care presented another steep hill to climb in a short timeframe. For
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hospitals such as the study site who do not own or control post-acute care facilities and have no
means to financially incentivize them, it takes considerable time and effort to effect practice and
behavioral changes that supported BPCI. Some studies point out that it is most effective to limit
these partnerships to just a small number and focus on the relationships and results.
Discussion about the Research
Four themes emerged over the course of this research study gleaned from the literature
and lessons learned: 1.) be wary of declarations of success that might be premature, 2.)
implementing a program like this is a monumental project, 3.) building relationships that have
aligned goals and rewards are key, and 4.) the effective and efficient delivery of healthcare is a
very complicated undertaking. These four themes are described more fully in the following
sections.
Do Not Call Victory Too Soon
Even though bundled payments and other alternative payment models have been around
for decades, none have been as widely implemented as BPCI. BPCI, however, was only launched
four years ago, and at the time of this study, CMS had only released evaluation data, information
and reports covering the first five quarters. While there are some significant and positive
financial, operational and clinical outcomes so far, there are also reported challenges and pockets
of the experiment where results failed to meet targets and goals. Much of the published literature
also discussed similar findings, and this particular study certainly is also an attestation of the
axiom, do not call victory too soon. More time, more provider participants, and more patients in
this and other bundled payment programs are needed to validate results and especially processes
and procedures. Despite this, CMS has continued on with bundled payments, implementing new
episode payment model programs in the last two years, voluntary and mandatory.
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It is Not a Flip of a Switch
Implementing an alternative payment model such as BPCI is an enormous undertaking,
and probably especially so for certain types of hospitals. Characteristics such as profit status,
financial health, capacity and agility to implement a project of this magnitude, community socioeconomics, patient demographics, and the list goes on. Far from being a flip of a switch, this
requires a cultural change in an organization and its provider partners in the continuum of care. It
requires a new mindset of clinical and financial integration, and a collective, coordinated and
longitudinal focus on patients care plans. It also requires a hefty investment of time and
resources, with potentially new staff roles (patient navigators, care coordinators, and clinicians
rounding on external post-acute facilities) and new service offerings (patient and family
education, follow-up patient interaction, and telehealth).
Relationships are the Magic
Relationships and collaboration among care providers and with patients are key design
elements in the BPCI model. There are a host of stakeholders involved in implementing bundled
payments effectively, and various complex relationships involving hospitals, physicians,
patients, payers, and post-acute care providers, and each is motivated differently. For a bundled
episode of care to be successful, all of the providers along the care chain have to be synchronized
about the goals and objectives. Each provider likely has their own historical practice patterns and
each is motivated by unique factors. Incentives, risks, and penalties have to be set at the right
levels to create alignment. For instance, upside incentives and/or downside risks that are too low
are not effective. Finally communication, transparency and near real time feedback foster these
relationships significantly.
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Healthcare is Greatly Complicated
Reengineering a healthcare delivery system is not at all akin to process improvements in
a manufacturing system of inanimate objects. Variation in human subjects is a natural hazard in
healthcare. This study and other prior research showed that there are potentially numerous
factors that confound the results. First and foremost, healthcare is an industry that has been
undergoing reform for many years, and many hospitals and providers have long been working
diligently on improving care delivery, reducing costs, and improving quality and safety. As such
it is difficult to look at outcomes for a program like BPCI in isolation of all the other initiatives
ongoing and attribute certain results to specific programs. As an example, population health
initiatives are particularly widespread and they require aspects of care redesign that are very
similar to bundled payments. Second, healthcare is far from a predictable business – hospitals
cannot accurately forecast patients demographics, complexity, volume, case mix, and sometimes
even government and regulatory changes. Finally, there are a myriad of business units,
individuals, government entities, and corporate structures all working in a complex maze of
clinical and financial laws and rules in one of the most regulated industries. It is complicated.
Practical Implications
This study’s quantitative and qualitative analysis have optimistically extended the body
of knowledge about the efficacy of alternative payment models in a large community hospital
that might also be generalizable to other hospitals across the country. In particular, this study
revealed significant challenges in implementing such programs and presented lessons learned. It
also demonstrated that while desired outcomes are possible, it might take considerably more
time, effort and program adjustments along the way to achieve them.
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For the executive leaders in healthcare delivery, this study shows that replacing the
traditional fee-for-service paradigm in the healthcare industry with bundled payments could reap
benefits for all of the participants in the healthcare value chain if implemented well: patients,
providers, and payors, alike. At the same time, it might contribute to solving the most vexing
problems of the U.S. healthcare system: the soaring costs and lack of consistent quality care. The
implementation models and care redesign programs discussed in the literature review chapter, as
well as the six-point program design at the study hospital all have potentially valuable tips for
future hospitals to ease the transition to bundled payments. The many factors, variables and
challenges discussed that could possibly impact outcomes might also be useful for hospitals
embarking on a bundled payment program.
For government entities and others working on innovative solutions to our healthcare
problems, this study adds one more empirical look at evidence supporting mixed results to those
already documented in published studies. The Lewin report (2016) indicated that there are not
enough current and past participants in the BPCI program yet to determine the true efficacy. This
study helps that cause and adds to the body of knowledge about the requirements and design
standards for bundled payment program implementations. Perhaps the lessons learned from this
hospital’s experiences, coupled with other empirical studies, might lead to the development of a
model that depicts at least some of the factors that are important in the implementation of a
bundled payment initiative, as well as the characteristics of the environment that may impact the
success of the program.
For academic scholars, this study hopefully sparks interest in continued research on this
topic. Some ideas for future work in this field are discussed in the following sections.
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Limitations
This research was designed as a retrospective analysis of data for a single hospital during
a short timeframe with a small number of patients. The study was constrained by time, data and
access that if not limited, could have yielded much richer results and discussion. The timeframe
was necessarily short because the BPCI program was fairly new and the study hospital had just
begun participating. The data was also limited because the hospital did not have access to postacute information or timely CMS data. In a more ideal design, a study such as this would include
data from multiple hospitals over a longer period of time, with a larger population of patients in
both control and treatment groups. With that additional scope, the study results might be more
generalizable. This study was also intentionally limited to investigating only certain factors that
may have impacted the results, such as hospital costs, length of stay and readmissions. It was not
feasible to consider other factors, such as patient, surgeon and post-acute facility profiles as well
as longitudinal program changes, due to data availability and research time allotted.
Future Research
This research study might set a foundation for future research in this focus area. In the
quantitative realm, there are many more studies that could be done to determine whether bundled
payment outcomes improve costs and quality of care. As examples, analysis could be done for
other clinical episodes, for acute care bundles versus chronic care bundles, for different
organization types (profit versus non-profit, single hospitals versus multi-hospital systems,
accountable care organizations, physician groups versus hospitals, systems with ownership in
multiple venues of care), for different patient demographics and complexity; for different
incentive models, and for additional payors such as commercial insurance companies. There are
also interesting qualitative studies that could be undertaken, such as case studies with physicians
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and post-acute care providers to determine what motivators and incentives would support
bundled payment programs. Research in this area could include a study applying some aspects of
Nudge theory, which suggests that a softer approach to achieving compliance than gainsharing
agreements could include positive reinforcement and indirect suggestions. Finally, focus groups
or surveys with patients and hospital staff might reveal how these programs impact them.
Conclusion
The results from this study and others on BPCI could provide valuable insight to those
engaged in healthcare delivery and payment innovation. It may influence future program design
and enable participants to achieve greater success that is essential to improving the quality and
efficiency of our care delivery system. The lessons learned from the research and published
literature could help inform healthcare transformation efforts particularly related to hospitals
effectively engaging with physicians and other providers to lower costs and improve care.
There are a plethora of significant challenges facing healthcare, not least skyrocketing
costs, an aging population with increasing chronic diseases, little coordination of care among
providers, not enough patient activation and engagement, and a lack of alignment in goals,
objectives and economics between providers, payors, patients, and employers. Only with
continued research on bundled payments and other versions of alternative payment programs will
we know whether this type of model is viable for the future and will begin to solve the heavy
healthcare cost and quality problems our country faces. Eventually, a payment system coupled
with a care delivery model will emerge that captures the best of all of the ideas and experimental
programs. This iterative process should continue to be informed by research and studies such as
this one as we collectively work toward the goals of better healthcare, controlled spending, and
healthy people.
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Appendix A: Summary of Affordable Care Act
Table 19. Summary of ACA compiled by author. Title III highlighted as the topic of this research
study. (Source: McDonough, 2011)
THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
PUBLIC LAW 111–148 ENACTED MARCH 23, 2010
TITLE I

QUALITY, AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE FOR ALL AMERICANS
This title makes various reforms to the nature and operation of private health insurance and
details the requirements of Health Insurance Exchanges

TITLE II

ROLE OF PUBLIC PROGRAMS
This title creates substantial changes to Medicaid and contains most of the provisions
relating to the Children’s Health Insurance Program
IMPROVING THE QUALITY AND EFFICIENCY OF HEALTH CARE
This title will protect and preserve Medicare and establishes new mechanisms to improve
the quality of medical care by making it more efficient and effective, and patient-centered.

TITLE III

Subtitle A -Transforming The Health Care Delivery System
Part III - Encouraging Development Of New Patient Care Models
Sec. 3023 - National Pilot Program On Payment Bundling:
Directs CMS to develop a national, voluntary pilot program encouraging hospitals,
physicians and post-acute care providers to improve patient care and achieve cost savings
for the Medicare program through bundled payment reimbursement models. The program is
to be established by January 1, 2013 for a period of five years. Before January 1, 2016,
CMS is also required to submit a plan to Congress to expand the pilot program if doing so
will improve patient care and reduce spending.

TITLE IV

PREVENTION OF CHRONIC DISEASE AND IMPROVING PUBLIC HEALTH
This title has provisions that promote healthier lifestyles for all Americans and to prevent
disease and disability

TITLE V

HEALTH CARE WORKFORCE
This title establishes a National Healthcare Workforce Commission to analyze and plan for
the healthcare workforce needs

TITLE VI

TRANSPARENCY AND PROGRAM INTEGRITY
This title provides new authority to federal and state agencies to combat fraud and abuse in
Medicare, Medicaid, and private health insurance

TITLE VII

IMPROVING ACCESS TO INNOVATIVE MEDICAL THERAPIES
This title directs a regulatory pathway for the development, manufacture, marketing, and
sale of bio-similar generic-like versions of biopharmaceutical drugs

COMMUNITY LIVING ASSISTANCE SUPPORTS AND SERVICES
TITLE VIII This title authorizes a new national and voluntary long-term disability insurance program to
provide workers support if they become permanently and temporarily disabled
TITLE IX

REVENUE PROVISIONS
This title has provisions to cover the financing for slightly less than half the cost of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act

TITLE X

STRENGTHENING QUALITY, AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE FOR ALL AMERICANS
This title includes amendments and additions to Titles I-IX and also reauthorizes the Indian
Health Care Improvement Act for American Indians and Alaskan Natives
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Appendix B: Summary of BPCI Initiative

Figure 23. Summary illustration of BPCI program. (Source: Caradigm, 2016)
Table 20. Summary of BPCI program compiled by author. Model 2 highlighted as the topic of
this research study. (Source: CMS, 2016)
BPCI
Participants

Episodes

Services included in
the bundle

Payment

Program Dates

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Skilled nursing, inpatient
Hospital, health system, rehabilitation, long-term
Hospital, health system
Hospital
physician group
care, home health,
physician group
Selected diagnoses;
Selected diagnoses;
Selected diagnoses;
All diagnoses; all acute
hospital plus post-acute
hospital plus
patients, hospital only
post-acute period only
period
readmissions
All non-hospice
All non-hospice Medicare
Medicare Part A and B
All non-hospice Medicare Part A and B services
All Medicare Part A
(including the hospital
services during the
Part A and B services
services paid as part of
and physician) during
initial inpatient stay,
during the post-acute
the MS-DRG payment
post-acute period and
period and readmissions initial inpatient stay and
readmissions
readmissions
Traditional fee for
Traditional fee for
service; retrospective
service; retrospective
Single prospective
Retrospective discounted
reconciliation with target reconciliation with target predetermined bundled
payment
payment
price that includes 2-3% price that includes 3%
discount
discount
April 2013 – December
October 2013 –
October 2013 –
October 2013 –
2016
September 2018
September 2018
September 2018

Number of Participants
1
as of April 1, 2016

649

862
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Appendix C: Glossary of Acronyms Related to this Study
Abbreviation

Meaning

ACA

Affordable Care Act

BPCI

Bundled Payments for Care Improvement

CJR

Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement

CMMI

Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation

CMS

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services

DRG

Diagnosis-Related Group

EPM

Episode Payment Model

FFS

Fee for Service

IDS

Integrated delivery system

IRF

Inpatient Rehabilitation Facility

LEJR

Lower Extremity Joint Replacement

LOS

Length of Stay

P4P

Pay for Performance

PAC

Post-Acute Care

SNF

Skilled Nursing Facility
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Appendix D: Glossary of Terms Related to this Study
Term

Definition in the context of this study

BPCI Beneficiary

A patient scheduled or admitted for the applicable clinical episode (LEJR
in this study) who is eligible for Medicare Part A and enrolled in Part B,
does not have End Stage Renal Disease and is not enrolled in any
managed care plan

BPCI Bundled
Payment

A predetermined target price for all of the items and services provided for
the episode of care. A retrospective reconciliation compares this target
price to the total fee for service payments made by CMS to the providers.
If the total fee for service payments is less than the target price, the
hospital receives the difference from CMS. If the total fee for service
payments exceeds the target price, the hospital must pay the difference to
CMS

BPCI Episode of
Care

The pre-admission test, patient’s hospital care, post-acute care, and all
related services which ends 30 days after initial hospital discharge

BPCI Outcomes –
Clinical

Assessed as the quality of care during an episode of care and measured in
two components: readmissions to the hospital and visits to the emergency
department during the 30 days following the initial hospital discharge.
Clinical outcomes are considered better if the 30-day readmissions of an
episode of care during the BPCI program is less than that of a similar
episode of care not in the BPCI program

BPCI Outcomes Financial

Assessed as the total cost of an episode of care and measured in two
components: hospital care cost and post-acute care cost. Financial
outcomes are considered better if the total cost of an episode of care
during the BPCI program is less than that of a similar episode of care not
in the BPCI program

BPCI Outcomes Operational

Assessed as the utilization of services during an episode of care and
measured in two components: patient length of stay in the hospital and
patient length of stay in a post-acute care facility. Operational outcomes
are considered better if the utilization of an episode of care during the
BPCI program is less than that of a similar episode of care not in the
BPCI program

BPCI Post-Acute
Care

Services from providers of care from the date of hospital discharge until
30 days after. This includes skilled nursing facilities, home health,
inpatient and outpatient rehabilitation and follow-up services, hospital
readmissions, and emergency care visits
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Fee for Service

The traditional way for hospitals and providers to be paid for care
rendered where each service is charged separately and payment is
received for each service

Medicare

A federal health insurance program for the elderly (people 65 years of age
or older), certain individuals with disabilities, and people with End Stage
Renal Disease. It is an entitlement program that differs from Medicaid,
which is a federal and state welfare program for the poor. In addition to
these federal programs, there are also commercial and private insurance
programs. Medicare has four parts (A, B, C and D) that cover different
services

Medicare Part A

Hospital insurance that covers inpatient hospital stays, care in a skilled
nursing facility, hospice care, and some home healthcare

Medicare Part B

Medical insurance that covers certain doctors' services, outpatient care,
medical supplies, and preventive services

Medicare Part C

A group of plans known as Medicare Advantage that are offered by
private companies contracted with Medicare to provide Part A and Part B
benefits

Medicare Part D

Prescription drug coverage offered by insurance companies and other
private companies approved by Medicare

Pay for
Performance

A more contemporary hospital and provider payment system that links
payment to quality and efficiency as an incentive to improve care and
decrease costs

Payment System Prospective

A system where the payment for a specific service is predetermined and
not based on actual costs incurred

Payment System Retrospective

A system where the payment for a specific service is based on actual costs
incurred

Provider Charge

The amount that the hospital or provider bills the insurance payor for a
service and this may not be equal to the cost of the service

Provider Cost

The actual amount that the hospital or provider actually incurs to provide
a service

Provider
Reimbursement

The amount an insurance payor, such as Medicare, actually pays the
hospital or provider for a service and it may not be the same as the costs
incurred or the charges billed
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Appendix E: USF Institutional Review Board Approval
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Appendix F: Hospital Institutional Review Board Approval (Redacted)
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Appendix G: Statistics Supporting Summary Results
Statistics Supporting Summary of Descriptive Variables
Summary Statistics for 3 Descriptive Variables: Age, Knee/Hip, and DRG. This output was
generated by IBM SPSS Statistics using the MEANS Procedure.

Report
BP_FLAG
0

AGE_CODE

Total

DRG470_FLAG

Mean

75.46

.53

.94

Std. Deviation

8.665

.500

.234

Minimum

47

0

0

Maximum

98

1

1

622

622

622

Mean

75.31

.53

.94

Std. Deviation

8.146

.499

.246

Minimum

45

0

0

Maximum

101

1

1

N

525

525

525

Mean

75.39

.53

.94

Std. Deviation

8.428

.499

.239

Minimum

45

0

0

Maximum

101

1

1

1147

1147

1147

N
1

KNEE_FLAG

N
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Statistics Supporting Summary of Dependent Variables
Summary Statistics for 3 Dependent Variables: HOSP_CHRG, HOSP_LOS, and
READMIT_FLAG. This output was generated by IBM SPSS Statistics using the MEANS
Procedure.

Report
BP_FLAG
0

HOSP_CHRG
Mean

3.98

.08

19960.793609999997000

1.804

.272

69156.30936000000000

3.00

.00

Minimum

30306.422430000000

1

0

Maximum

308477.349600000000

20

1

622

622

622

54.2%

54.2%

54.2%

73571.63023000000000

3.64

.08

20038.067890000000000

1.943

.274

70798.87245000000000

3.00

.00

Minimum

35140.236480000000

1

0

Maximum

257373.000000000000

21

1

525

525

525

45.8%

45.8%

45.8%

72964.81585000000000

3.83

.08

19995.248509999998000

1.876

.273

69656.63629000000000

3.00

.00

Minimum

30306.422430000000

1

0

Maximum

308477.349600000000

21

1

1147

1147

1147

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Median

N
% of Total N
Mean
Std. Deviation
Median

N
% of Total N
Total

READMIT_FLAG

72452.63329000000000

Std. Deviation

1

HOSP_LOS

Mean
Std. Deviation
Median

N
% of Total N
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Statistics Supporting Summary of Other Variables
Summary Statistics for Other Dependent Variables. This output was generated by IBM SPSS
Statistics using the MEANS Procedure.
Report
BP_FLAG
0

SSI_FLAG

DVTPE_FLAG

Mean

.0096

.0080

.0000

622

622

622

54.2%

54.2%

54.2%

.0000

.0038

.7124

525

525

525

45.8%

45.8%

45.8%

Mean

.0052

.0061

.3261

N

1147

1147

1147

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

N
% of Total N
1

Mean
N
% of Total N

Total

PREOP_ED_FLAG

% of Total N

Report
BP_FLAG
0

Mean

DCSNF_

DCIRF_

DCEXP_

DCOTHER_

FLAG

FLAG

FLAG

FLAG

FLAG

FLAG

.3698

.5386

.0161

.0048

.0129

622

622

622

622

622

622

54.2%

54.2%

54.2%

54.2%

54.2%

54.2%

.0838

.4114

.4781

.0229

.0038

.0000

525

525

525

525

525

525

45.8%

45.8%

45.8%

45.8%

45.8%

45.8%

Mean

.0697

.3888

.5109

.0192

.0044

.0070

N

1147

1147

1147

1147

1147

1147

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

% of Total N
Mean
N
% of Total N
Total

DCHH_

.0579

N

1

DCHOME_

% of Total N
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Appendix H. Statistics Supporting Research Question 1 Results
Statistics Supporting Hospital Charges Trend Graph
Trend of Mean Hospital Charges Before and After BPCI. This output was generated by Tableau
Desktop Professional.
Trend Line Equation
P-value: 0.0707607
Equation: Avg. HOSP_CHRG = 3.17888*Month of Admit Date + -60988.3
Coefficients
Term
Value
StdErr t-value
p-value
3.17888
1.70404
1.86549
0.0707607
ADMIT_MONTH
-60988.3 71864.5 -0.848657 0.402008
Intercept
Trend Lines Model
A linear trend model is computed for average of HOSP_CHRG given ADMIT_MONTH.
Model formula:
(ADMIT_MONTH + intercept)
Number of modeled observations: 36
Number of filtered observations: 0
Model degrees of freedom:
2
Residual degrees of freedom (DF): 34
SSE (sum squared error):
3.55648e+08
MSE (mean squared error):
1.04602e+07
R-Squared:
0.092851
Standard error:
3234.23
p-value (significance):
0.0707607
Individual Trend Lines
Panes
Line
Coefficients
Row
Column
p-value
DF Term
Value
StdErr t-value
p-value
HOSP_CHRG ADMIT_MONTH 0.0707607 34 ADMIT_MONTH 3.17888 1.70404 1.86549 0.0707607
intercept
-60988.3 71864.5 -0.848657 0.402008
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Statistics Supporting Hospital Charges Assumptions Tests
Assumptions Test of Normality and Test of Homogeneity of Variance for Dependent Variable
Hospital Charges. This output was generated by IBM SPSS Statistics using the EXPLORE
Procedure.
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Histograms illustrating departures from normality.

115

Statistics Supporting Hospital Charges Hypothesis Test
Hypothesis Test for Dependent Variable Hospital Charges. This output was generated by IBM
SPSS Statistics using the T-Test Procedure and the Nonparametric Test Procedure.

T-Test

Nonparametric Test
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Statistics Supporting CMS Payment Trend Graphs
Summary Statistics for CMS Payment Variables. This output was generated by IBM SPSS
Statistics using the MEANS Procedure.
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Statistics Supporting Hospital Charges Tests for KNEE ONLY

118

Statistics Supporting Hospital Charges Tests for HIP ONLY
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Statistics Supporting Hospital Charges Tests for DRG 470 ONLY

120

Statistics Supporting Hospital Charges Tests for DRG 469 ONLY
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Appendix I: Statistics Supporting Research Question 2 Results
Statistics Supporting Hospital Length of Stay Trend Graph
Trend of Mean Hospital Length of Stay Before and After BPCI. This output was generated by
Tableau Desktop Professional.
Trend Line Equation
P-value: 0.0058659
Equation: Avg. HOSP_LOS = -0.000511543*ADMIT_MONTH + 25.398
Coefficients
Term
Value
StdErr
t-value p-value
ADMIT_MONTH -0.0005115 0.000174 -2.93995 0.0058659
Intercept
25.398
7.33798 3.46117 0.0014694
Trend Lines Model
A linear trend model is computed for average of HOSP_LOS given ADMIT_MONTH.
The model may be significant at p <= 0.05.
Model formula:
(ADMIT_MONTH + intercept)
Number of modeled observations: 36
Number of filtered observations: 0
Model degrees of freedom:
2
Residual degrees of freedom (DF): 34
SSE (sum squared error):
3.70804
MSE (mean squared error):
0.10906
R-Squared:
0.202688
Standard error:
0.330242
p-value (significance):
0.0058659
Individual Trend Lines
Panes
Line
Coefficients
Row
Column
p-value DF Term
Value
StdErr t-value p-value
HOPS_LOS ADMIT_MONTH 0.0058659 34 ADMIT_MONTH -0.0005115 0.000174 -2.93995 0.0058659
intercept
25.398
7.33798 3.46117 0.0014694
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Statistics Supporting Hospital Length of Stay Assumptions Tests
Assumptions Test of Normality and Test of Homogeneity of Variance for Dependent Variable
Hospital Length of Stay. This output was generated by IBM SPSS Statistics using the EXPLORE
Procedure.
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Histograms illustrating departures from normality.
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Statistics Supporting Hospital Length of Stay Hypothesis Test
Hypothesis Test for Dependent Variable Hospital Length of Stay. This output was generated by
IBM SPSS Statistics using the T-Test Procedure and the Nonparametric Test Procedure.

T-Test

Nonparametric Test
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Statistics Supporting Hospital Length of Stay Tests for KNEE ONLY
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Statistics Supporting Hospital Length of Stay Tests for HIP ONLY
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Statistics Supporting Hospital Length of Stay Tests for DRG 470 ONLY
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Statistics Supporting Hospital Length of Stay Tests for DRG 469 ONLY
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Appendix J: Statistics Supporting Research Question 3 Results
Statistics Supporting 30-Day Readmissions Trend Graph
Trend of Rate of 30-Day Readmissions Before and After BPCI. This output was generated by
Tableau Desktop Professional.
Trend Line Equation
P-value: 0.606483
Equation: Avg. READMIT_FLAG = -1.43513e-05*ADMIT_MONTH + 0.687056
Coefficients
Term
Value
StdErr t-value
p-value
ADMIT_MONTH -1.435e-05 2.76e-05 -0.519928 0.606483
intercept
0.687056 1.16408 0.590214 0.55895
Trend Lines Model
A linear trend model is computed for average of Readmit given ADMIT_MONTH.
Model formula:
(ADMIT_MONTH + intercept )
Number of modeled observations: 36
Number of filtered observations: 0
Model degrees of freedom:
2
Residual degrees of freedom (DF): 34
SSE (sum squared error):
0.0933158
MSE (mean squared error):
0.0027446
R-Squared:
0.007888
Standard error:
0.0523888
p-value (significance):
0.606483
Individual Trend Lines
Panes
Row

Line
Coefficients
p-value DF Term
Value
StdErr t-value
p-value
READMIT_FLAG ADMIT_MONTH 0.606483 34 ADMIT_MONTH -1.435e-05 2.76e-05 -0.519928 0.606483
intercept
0.687056 1.16408 0.590214 0.55895
Column
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Statistics Supporting 30-Day Readmissions Hypothesis Test
Comparison of Proportions for Dependent Variable 30-Day Readmissions. This output was
generated by IBM SPSS Statistics using the CROSSTAB Procedure.
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Statistics Supporting 30-day Readmissions Tests for KNEE ONLY

Statistics Supporting 30-day Readmissions Tests for HIP ONLY
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Statistics Supporting 30-day Readmissions Tests for DRG 470 ONLY

Statistics Supporting 30-day Readmissions Tests for DRG 469 ONLY
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Appendix K: Statistics Supporting Other Results
Statistics Supporting Surgical Site Infections Trend Graph
Trend of Rate of Surgical Site Infections Before and After BPCI. This output was generated by
Tableau Desktop Professional.
Trend Line Equation
P-value: 0.0479148
Equation: Avg. SSI_FLAG = -1.14648e-05*ADMIT_MONTH + 0.487752
Coefficients
Term
Value
StdErr
t-value p-value
ADMIT_MONTH -1.146e-05 5.587e-06 -2.05219 0.0479148
intercept
0.487752 0.235604 2.07022 0.0460952
Statistics Supporting Surgical Site Infections Comparison of Proportions
Comparison of Proportions for Variable Surgical Site Infections. This output was generated by
IBM SPSS Statistics using the CROSSTAB Procedure.
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Statistics Supporting Deep Vein Thrombosis/Pulmonary Embolism Trend Graph
Trend of Rate of Deep Vein Thrombosis/Pulmonary Embolism Before and After BPCI. This
output was generated by Tableau Desktop Professional.
Trend Line Equation
P-value: 0.733029
Equation: Avg. DVTPE_FLAG = -2.47717e-06*ADMIT_MONTH + 0.110151
Coefficients
Term
Value
StdErr
t-value
p-value
ADMIT_MONTH -2.477e-06 7.203e-06 -0.343914 0.733029
intercept
0.110151 0.303767 0.362617 0.719136
Statistics Supporting Deep Vein Thrombosis/Pulm Embolism Comparison of Proportions
Comparison of Proportions for Variable Deep Vein Thrombosis/Pulmonary Embolism. This
output was generated by IBM SPSS Statistics using the CROSSTAB Procedure.
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Statistics Supporting Pre-Operative Education Trend Graph
Trend of Rate of Pre-Operative Education Before and After BPCI. This output was generated by
Tableau Desktop Professional.
Trend Line Equation
P-value: 0.0345289
Equation: Avg. PREOP_ED_FLAG = 0.000770911*ADMIT_MONTH + -32.014
Coefficients
Term
Value
StdErr
t-value p-value
ADMIT_MONTH 0.0007709 0.0003337 2.31044 0.0345289
intercept
-32.014
14.1627 -2.26043 0.0380888
Statistics Supporting Pre-Operative Education Comparison of Proportions
Comparison of Proportions for Variable Pre-Operative Education. This output was generated by
IBM SPSS Statistics using the CROSSTAB Procedure.
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Statistics Supporting Discharge Disposition Comparison of Proportions
Comparison of Proportions for 6 Variables related to Discharge Disposition. This output was
generated by IBM SPSS Statistics using the CROSSTAB Procedure.
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Appendix L: Permission to use Figures from Peter G. Peterson Foundation
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